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BRITISH GAMING ACT OF 1968
JOSEPH M. KELLY*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Gaming Act of 1968 has been one of the most successful
short-term pieces of legislation in British history. Its purpose was to
reduce the number of casinos,' regulate gaming, curb excessive profits,
eliminate mug or sucker bets, and minimize the influence of organized
crime. The Act "was a far-sighted piece of legislation that radically
changed the whole course of casino gaming"2 by carefully delineating
the procedures necessary for a license. It made "sensible relaxations in
the law," while it "set up a whole new code for gaming and provided
for control of commercial gaming, and certain forms of non-commercial
gaming by regulation . . . . and by setting up of a control body in the
shape of the Gaming Board"" which was "a powerful and autonomous
branch of the Home Office." 4 The Government's main objectives in
promulgating the Act were to eliminate organized crime and effectively
control commercial gaming "by regulating the quality and the availa-
bility of gaming facilities."5 The Act's framework, however, has been
described as "schizophrenic," ' and its effectiveness in reducing the
number of casinos has resulted in its being referred to as the "holo-
caust." Nevertheless, profits in the casino industry and other areas of
regulated gaming in Great Britain have increased tremendously as a
result of the Act.
It has been said that the Act created a regulatory board with pro-
* Joseph M. Kelly, J.D., Ph.D., is a partner in Ashleman, Evans & Kelly (Reno,
Nevada), and is on the faculty of the National Judicial College in Reno.
1. Casinos have been defined as "proprietary clubs licensed for gaming other than
bingo." Address by Geoffrey B. Littman, Sixth International Conference on Gambling
and Risk Taking in Atlantic City, N.J. (December 1984).
2. Kent-Lemon, Significant Influences on the United Kingdom Casino Industry
Since 1960, 474 ANNALS 72 (1984).
3. J. FINNEY, GAMING, LOTTERIES, FUND-RAISING AND THE LAW 4 (1982).
4. The Times (London) July 4, 1977, at 8, col. e.
5. Miers, Regulation of Commercial Gambling, 11 J.L. & Soc'v 37 (1984).
6. THE MONOPOLIES AND MERGERS COMMISSION, A REPORT ON THE PROPOSED MERGER
OF PLEASURAMA PLC AND TRIDENT TELEVISION PLC, AND BETWEEN GRAND METROPOLITAN
PLC AND TRIDENT TELEVISION PLC, Cmd. 9108, at para. 9.37 (1983) [hereinafter MONOP-
OLIES COMMISSION REPORT].
7. The Times (London), Feb. 25, 1984, at 11, col. a.
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.
cedures akin to those of the despotic seventeenth century Star Cham-
ber Court.' The Royal Commission on Gambling (Rothschild Commis-
sion) concluded that the Board's powers were "wide and arbitrary."9
This Board has been variously described as a body which was given
powers that "were hard on the citizen,"'" and as a body which has
made the regulated gaming industry "clearly reluctant even to risk in-
curring the displeasure of a body which has such wide powers to affect
their livelihoods.""
Often overlooked is the fact that the vast majority of Parliament
and certain special interest groups would have preferred that the La-
bor Government establish an even more powerful and arbitrary board.
In commenting on the Board's power to revoke employment certifi-
cates of casino employees, an opposition party spokesman concluded
that "one does not like the Star Chamber atmosphere, or giving any
body of people the power to deprive a person of his living, but in these
circumstances it is right to do so. '"2
It has also been alleged that the Act was the result of the activity
of anti-gaming elements. For example, in Regina v. Metropolitan Po-
lice Commissioner ex parte Blackburn,'" Lord Denning, Master of the
Rolls, (M.R.), stated that the Act was the result of the activity of Ray-
mond Blackburn, the bte noire of gaming, whose "case about gaming
. . .led directly to the reform of the law by the Gaming Act, 1968."1"
Although anti-gaming elements were very wary about what the Act
might legalize, it was the reputable gaming community which was most
supportive of the Act.'9 If earlier laws which prohibited games of une-
qual chance, were enforced, argued anti-gaming spokesmen, any new
Act was unnecessary.
1 6
8. H. SKOLNICK, HOUSE OF CARDS 340 (1978), describes the Board as the most auto-
cratic institution since the Star Chamber. At oral argument, the attorney for the appli-
cants in Regina v. Gaming Board for Great Britain ex parte Benaim, also accused the
Board of Star Chamber procedures. The Times (London), Mar. 17, 1970, at 4, col. g.
9. REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON GAMBLING, Cmd. 7200, at 280 (1978) [herein-
after ROTHSCHILD REPORT].
10. Regina v. Gaming Board for Great Britain ex parte Benaim. The Times (London)
March 23, 1971, at 3, col. c (Parker, L.C.J. in oral argument).
11. ROTHSCHILD REPORT, supra note 9, at para. 19.23.
12. 766 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 128 (1968).
13. [1968] 1 All E.R. 763 (C.A.).
14. Regina v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner ex parte Blackburn, No. 414/78
(C.A. Mar. 6, 1980) (available on LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases file). See also Regina v.
Metropolitan Police Commissioner ex porte Blackburn, [1968] 1 All E.R. 763 (C.A.).
15. Interview with W. Rees-Davies, former Q.C., former M.P., at International Bar
Association, Section on Gaming Law, in New York City (Sept. 9, 1986).
16. The Times (London), Feb. 6, 1968, at 9, col. e (letter to the Editor from Raymond
Blackburn).
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A. Widespread Illegal Gaming Before The 1968 Act
Gaming was not illegal at common law. Until Charles II, anti-gam-
ing legislation was based primarily on pragmatic goals-the mainte-
nance of archery and the prevention of lower class time-wasting.1 7 Be-
ginning in the second half of the seventeenth century, parliamentary
legislation tried to restrict gaming on a piecemeal basis, based primar-
ily on a moralistic rationale. The Gaming Act of 1845 and other
"grandmotherly laws," 8 attempted to eliminate gaming loopholes and,
in effect, prohibited gaming. These acts made all gaming contracts void
and established an easier burden of proof to discourage gaming houses.
Rather than eliminating gaming, however, these acts drove much of the
gaming business underground and consequently cost the police "much
in money and manpower."' 9 As a result of underground gaming, one
would hear of "beautiful suitors luring debs to private parties, and
daddy then being asked to pay her cheque because darling had broken
the law."20 Thus, "[b]efore 1960 the greater part of the law controlling
gambling in Great Britain was obscure, illogical and difficult to
enforce."'"
Modern British gaming law is largely the result of the Betting and
Gaming Act of 1960, and the Gaming Act of 1968. The Betting and
Gaming Act of 1960 marked "the first great change in approach 2 2
since the 1845 Act. The 1960 Act legalized almost all forms of gaming
except those games of unequal chance (e.g., roulette with a zero) or
those held in public places. In order to placate bona fide member
clubs, however, the Act allowed an exception of a fixed sum charge
apart from the stakes for members and guests.
This exception for clubs opened the door to unique commercial
gaming clubs which prospered throughout Britain, especially in the
London area. Throughout the 1960's, gaming clubs were able to use
legal loopholes so that between 1,000 and 1,20021 casinos sprung up
17. FINNEY, supra note 3, at 1.
18. Rolph, Fortune an Honest Woman, 1967 NEW STATESMAN 897.
19. GAMING BOARD FOR GREAT BRITAIN, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT para. 33 (1969) [here-
inafter BOARD REPORT (1969)].
20. Gift to the Mafia? THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 3, 1968, at 15, col. 2.
21. GREAT BRITAIN CENTRAL OFFICE OF INFORMATION, CONTROL OF GAMBLING IN BRIT-
AIN 1 (London 1974).
22. FINNEY. supra note 3, at 4.
23. Bacon, The Gaming Act, 1968, Takes Hold, 53 POLICE J. 257 (1970), states that
there "were upwards of 1,200 clubs"; that compared with the number of British betting
shops was "a small number"; and "in comparison with other countries where gaming was
permitted, it was an almost incredible number." London alone had between 300-500
clubs. The Times (London), July 20, 1968, at 7, col. e. See also Miers, supra note 5, at
37.
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"like weeds" '24 throughout Great Britain. There developed "a feeling
that Britain was becoming Europe's offshore Las Vegas '25 or the "gam-
bling headquarters of the world."26 To evade successful prosecution,
casino owners began what the Government described as "cat-and-
mouse games" ' of litigation that made the enforcement of laws all but
impossible. 9 As one Member of Parliament explained, "no matter
what law we pass, if we try to put any definition in the Statute, then as
sure as night follows day the experts will get round it within 24
hours. '2 9 Lord Denning, M.R., likewise regretted that gaming houses
"always seem to be one device" ahead of the law"13' and that gaming
law evasion was so successful "that the police had given up any efforts
to enforce the law." 2 Sir Stanley Raymond, the first Gaming Board
Chairman, described the law before 1968 to be in "such a muddle,"
that the police were given "an almost impossible job. '33 Police officials
said that "as fast as one method of play was held to be illegal, a new
method was invented to take its place. ... -34
24. ROTHSCHILD REPORT, supra note 9, at para. 18.1.
25. BOARD REPORT (1969), supra note 19, at para. 14. The Colony Club, a London
casino, was controlled by Meyer Lansky, who, seeing that ". . .things were getting too
hot in Vegas he moved his operations to the Caribbean and into England .... The Col-
ony was good for at least three to four million bucks a week in action. Unlike most
casinos around the world, the Colony Club operated honest at the tables." TERESA, MY
LIFE IN THE MAFIA 217-18 (1973).
26. R. CROSSMAN, 2 THE DIARIES OF A CABINET MINISTER 169 (1976).
27. 293 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 855 (1968); Cline, The Law, Uncertain Stakes,
Spectator, Feb. 16, 1968, at 198, col. 1 also described the situation as a "ceaseless cat and
mouse game between the Courts and the Clubs."
28. See Regina v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner ex parte Blackburn, Law Re-
port, The Times (London), Jan. 30, 1968, at 11, col. h.
29. 758 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1249 (1968). 4 W. BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES *173,
concluded: "The invention of sharpers being swifter than the punishment of the law
which only hunts them from one device to another ...... Id.
30. Cline, supra note 27, at 198, col. 1, questioned Lord Denning's criticism of gamers
using devices. "Either the law prohibits or it does not, and it is for the courts to say loud
and clear what is not permissible, and if it fails to do so, even gaming club proprietors
are entitled to pursue their smokey nocturnal ways undisturbed." Id.
31. Regina v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner ex parte Blackburn, [1968] 1 All
E.R. 763, 766 (C.A.).
32. Regina v. Gaming Board for Great Britain ex parte Benaim and Khaida [1970] 2
Q.B. 417, 2 W.L.R. 1009, 114 Sol. J. 266; sub nom Regina v. Gaming Board for Great
Britain ex parte Benaim [19701 2 All E.R. 528, 529 (C.A.).
33. The Times (London), Apr. 9, 1970, at 2, col. g.
34. BOARD REPORT (1969), supra note 19, at para. 106.
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B. Recognition of British Love of Gaming
Outright suppression of gaming by strict enforcement of the law
was made impractical by the British love of gaming. The vast majority
(94%) of adult Britains gamble, with 39% of them gaming on a regular
basis."
Unlike the egalitarianism found in Nevada and New Jersey, a
strong class/sex"' division exists within British gaming. Certain London
clubs are often the special playground of wealthy foreigners, while the
arcades have been described as the working man's casino.3 7 Betting
shops are the neighborhood "preserves of men"' s while over 80% of
bingo club participants are working-class women,3 9 with almost 90 % of
them over age thirty."' Illustrating these class/sex attitudes within
Great Britain are the remarks of Viscount Massereene and Ferrard,
who said that if the government tightened up on loitering at betting
shops, it would be the "hero to many thousands of wives."4 1
35. Rothschild Commission findings, quoted in THE ECONOMIST, July 15, 1978, at 20,
col. 3. Arthur Davidson said in Parliament "Itihere is in the British people a gambling
itch .... 758 PARL. DEa., H.C. (5th ser.) 1199 (1968).
36. An excellent example of class bias would be the remarks of Lawton, J. in Regina
v. Coral, No. 1694/132/82 (C.A. May 20, 1983) (available on LEXIS, Enggen Library,
Cases file), in explaining why he was reducing the penalties of those convicted of al-
lowing illegal gaming credit. "Parliament .... clearly did not want a situation where
men could gamble away their inheritances by being allowed to gamble on credit over a
long period of time." Id. Whatever purpose motivated the socialist government, the pres-
ervation of inheritance was not a factor.
37. The Times (London), July 25, 1984, at 11, col. a. There is also, unlike Nevada, a
class division within casinos where the high rollers often have separate gaming rooms. It
is perhaps an exaggeration to conclude as did Jerome H. Skolnick that in London "gam-
ing casinos are not permitted in working class suburbs. Membership in the clubs must be
sponsored, and is costly enough to bar the average industrial worker." SKOLNICK, A ZON-
ING MERIT MODEL FOR CASINO GAMBLING 56 (1978). This observation may be true of the
exclusive clubs such as Aspinall's and Crockford's but it is not true of the working-class
casinos.
38. The Times (London), Mar. 3, 1984, at 11, col. c. Interestingly, betting shops are
often more of a local "club" than casinos. Interview with Bob Greene, Managing Direc-
tor, Mecca Bookmakers (July 15, 1985).
39. The Times (London), Mar. 3, 1984, at 77, col. a. The Reports of the Gaming
Board indicate that 84 ' of bingo participants are female. GAMING BOARD FOR GREAT
BRITAIN, FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT para. 54 (1972) [hereinafter BOARD REPORT (1972)];
GAMING BOARD FOR GREAT BRITAIN, EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT para. 62 (1976) [hereinafter
BOARD REPORT (1976)].
40. BOARD REPORT (1972), supra note 39, at para. 54.
41. 344 PARL. DEE., H.L. (5th ser.) 1655 (1973). A Labor peer responded that if the
government were concerned with absenteeism caused by betting centers, they should
consider Ascot. Id.
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C. Desire for Strict Control of Gaming
A type of Cromwellian Puritan"' outlook toward gambling co-ex-
ists with the love of gambling in Britain. "England treats gambling
rather like prostitution, recognizing its existence and allowing it as a
necessary outlet for deep and dark desires but ensuring that nothing
whatsoever is done to encourage it."' 3 The Home Office in its Introduc-
tion to the Gaming Act, 1968, considered commercial gaming to be "a
privilege to be conceded subject to the most searching scrutiny and
only in response to public demand.""" The judiciary has also joined in
this negative attitude toward gaming. Lord Denning agreed that gam-
ing was a "privilege" or a "franchise-to carry on gaming for profit, a
thing never hitherto allowed in this country.' 5 The modern judicial
attitude toward gaming is perhaps expressed best as considering it
"personally demoralising, domestically degrading and economically
stultifying . ... ,
D. Roulette: "Cat and Mouse" Litigation
One of the major complicating factors in British gaming was the
number of "conflicting court decisions"'4 which attempted to define
what constituted games of equal chance not prohibited by Section
32(1)(a) of the 1963 Act.' This explanation was crucial since casinos
42. This attitude is stronger on the left. The expression "semi-Cromwellian Puritans"
used in the Act debated by Antony Buck, concerning Home Secretary Callaghan, de-
scribed the Socialist government's overall gaming attitude. 766 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.)
368 (1968). Bob Melish's remarks would be more typical of Labor than the Tories. A
decade after the Act, Melish, M.P., emphasized that "if every British casino closed, it
would probably do Britain a great deal of good." Melish further argued that if casinos
"scream for mercy, there is only one answer. They can shut up shop and go home." 972
PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 84 (1979). Even the more moderate Social Democratic Party
leader, David Owen, pledged that his party "would throw over the tables of what he
dubbed the Conservatives 'casino society' ". The Times (London), Jan. 4, 1987, at 1, col.
g.
43. Hamilton, The Gambling Industry, The Times (London), Feb. 25, 1984, at 11,
col. a.
44. ROTHSCHILD REPORT, supra note 9, at para. 16.11.
45. Regina v. Gaming Board ex parte Beniam [1970] 2 All E.R. 528, 533 (C.A.).
46. News of the World, Ltd. v. Friend, [1973] 1 All E.R. 422 (H.L.) (Simon, L. J.
dissenting).
47. 758 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1270 (1968). Members of Parliament frequently
blamed the courts for the loopholes. Quintin Hogg (now Lord Hailsham) states that in
addition to other factors, the 1960 Act ". . .failed in detail precisely because of the way
the Courts interpreted it." Hogg, The Gaming Muddle, PUNCH, Feb. 14, 1968, at 232, col.
1.
48. The statute provided that "...(i) the chances in the game are equally favourable
to all the players; or (ii) the gaming is so conducted that the chances therein are equally
favourable to all the players. Betting, Gaming and Lotteries Act, 1963, ch. 2 § 32 (1)
(a).
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with no house "edge," could not make profits except by charging for
use of facilities.
Roulette, which since the 1960's had been more popular than all
other games of unequal chance combined, was the usual litigation test-
ing ground for casinos.4 9 In April 1966, Kursaal Casino, Ltd., offered
the "bank" with its "edge" of a zero at regular intervals to "any player
who chose to take it."50 Only two of its members within a five and a
half month period utilized this opportunity, and then at only a very
limited amount.51 On December 19, 1967, the House of Lords reversed
a Divisional Court decision and held that the practical realities of of-
fering players the roulette bank with a zero did not overcome the pro-
hibition against games of unequal chance.
52
Casino representatives such as the British Gaming Association in-
dicated they would attempt alternate versions of roulette and pre-
dicted that further litigation would be in the offing.5 3 Subsequent to
the House of Lords decision, most London casinos continued "playing
roulette, unmolested, in exactly the same way. . . as they were doing
49. Board statistics from Reports of 1973 through 1983 show American roulette at a
low 50% in 1974, GAMING BOARD FOR GREAT BRITAIN, SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT para. 19
(1975) [hereinafter BOARD REPORT (1975)], to a high 64.6% in 1982, GAMING BOARD FOR
GREAT BRITAIN, FIFTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT para. 23 (1983) [hereinafter BOARD REPORT
(1983)], and French roulette at a low .7% in 1982, BOARD REPORT (1983), supra, at para.
23, to a high 8% in 1976, GAMING BOARD FOR GREAT BRITAIN, TENTH ANNUAL REPORT
para. 27 (1978) [hereinafter BOARD REPORT (1978)]. The difference between the games is
minimal.
50. Crickitt v. Kursaal Casino (No. 2), [1968] 1 All E.R. 139. This practice, in effect,
let the player assume the role of the house for a limited time.
51. Id.
52. Crickitt v. Kursaal Casino, Ltd. (No.2) [1968] 1 All E.R. 139, rev'g Kursaal Casino
v. Crickitt (No. 2) [1967] 3 All E.R. 360. Even when one of the players held the bank,
odds would still "not be equally favorable to all players." 118 NEW L.J. 3 (1968). In 758
PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1201 (1968), Arthur Davidson stated, "[o]ne of the most dis-
reputable aspects about gaming over the last two or three years has been the constant
evasion by the clubs of the regulations-the 1960 Act. First of all they tried to evade it
by passing the bank round. Then it was discovered that no one would take a bank for a
short period. Then they tried to evade it by giving out coloured chips and asking the
customer to operate a voluntary levy, but that did not work very well." Id. It would
seem, however, that these devices worked only too well, hence the litigation.
53. The Times (London), January 2, 1968, at 1, col. e. The Casino Association repre-
senting the so-called Big Five (Clermont, Crockford's, Curzon, Palm Beach, and Play-
boy), after deliberation announced they would play roulette without a zero. The Times
(London), January 4, 1968, at 2, col. a. The Times (London), January 5, 1968, at 2, col. g.
Home Secretary James Callaghan analogized future casino litigation to the "dance of the
seven veils." 758 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1166 (1968).
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prior to Dec. 19, 1967."' The situation was further exacerbated by the
London Assistant Police Commissioner's secret instructions in April of
1966 to interfere with gaming clubs only if there were allegations of
cheating or if the club "had become a haunt of criminals.""5
As a result of police inactivity, Raymond Blackburn, a former La-
bor M.P., and one of the most vehement anti-gaming activists, applied
for an order of mandamus to require the police to enforce the law
prohibiting games of unequal chance. In Regina v. Metropolitan Police
Commissioner ex parte Blackburn,5" the Divisional Court dismissed
his complaint on July 11, 1967, because gaming clubs were "in a very
low place in the list of [law enforcement] priorities. ' '57 Counsel for the
Commissioner predictably argued both the lack of jurisdiction58 and
the inapplicability of mandamus, since a commissioner had no duty to
prosecute. During the appellate hearing in January of 1968, counsel for
the Commissioner suddenly assured the court that the prior secret in-
structions would be officially revoked and unlawful gaming in London
clubs would now be prosecuted." Lord Denning commented that in
this "unique"6 0 case, some of the Commissioner's "policy decisions"
were subject to court interference,6 1 and the threat of mandamus by
interested parties might be the applicable remedy. He further stressed
that the "policy decision" not to prosecute was most "unfortunate,"
and that for casinos, "the day of reckoning is at hand. No longer will
we tolerate these devices. The law must be sensibly interpreted so as to
give effect to the intentions of Parliament; and the police must see that
54. Regina v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner ex parte Blackburn, [1968] 1 All
E.R. 763, 774 (C.A.).
55. Id. at 768. See also Ex-MP Wants Police Ordered to Enforce Gaming Law, The
Times (London), Jan. 25, 1968, at 12, col. d.
56. [1968] 1 All E.R. 763 (C.A.).
57. The Times (London), January 25, 1968, at 12, col. d. However, Lord Denning
considered the case ". . .so important-not only on locus standi, but also on police pow-
ers .... " DENNING, THE DISCIPLINE OF LAW 119 (1979).
58. "No appeal shall lie-(a) except as provided by this Act, the Administration of
Justice Act, 1960 or the Criminal Appeal Act, 1968, from any judgment of the High
Court in any criminal cause or matter; (b) from an order allowing an extension of time
for appealing from a judgment or order." Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation)
Act 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, ch. 49, § 31 (1) (a) & (b).
59. Ex-MP Wants Police Ordered to Enforce Gaming Law, The Times (London),
Jan. 25, 1968, at 12, col. d; No Legal Duty on Police to Prosecute, The Times (London),
Jan. 26, 1968, at 11, col. a.
60. Id.
61. Gaming Clubs Are Facing 'Day of Reckoning', The Times (London), Jan. 30,
1968, at 11, col. h. See also Regina v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, ex parte Black-
burn, [1968] 1 All E.R. 763, 768, 770.
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it is enforced." 2 This ruling was considered a "remarkable success"63
for Blackburn in that he had persuaded the courts to reprimand the
Police Commissioner. The police immediately began prosecution of
many London clubs, resulting in further ingenious tactics by clubs
seeking legal loopholes. 4 Victoria Sporting Club, Ltd., for example, re-
quested successful roulette winners to return a "marker" chip among
the thirty-six awarded them."" At a hearing, it was uncontested that
the return of the marker chips were voluntary and that most players
returned the chips to the club."6 As a result, Victoria and one of its
directors, were found guilty of violating the Act and fined £200 and
£100, respectively.6 7 The courts described the £100 penalty as "almost
half an hour's profit." 8 As a result of alleged police inaction, light pen-
alties and the apparent increase in the number of casinos, Blackburn
again moved for injunctive relief. The police were apparently unable to
62. Regina v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, ex parte Blackburn [1968] 1 All
E.R. 763, 770. See also, Why No Injunction To Stop Illegal Gaming? The Times
(London), July 20, 1968, at 7, col. e.
63. Cline, Uncertain Stakes, Spectator, Feb. 16, 1968, at 198, col. 2. Blackburn
throughout 1968 and 1969 remained active in battles with whom he perceived were gam-
ing supporters. He opposed the new "pool" system in roulette which required a £10
charge per session. The Times (London), Nov. 6, 1968, at 3, col. b. In December, of 1968,
he took out private summonses against Playboy, Crockford's and the Golden Nugget as
well as various directors of the three casinos and the Chairman of the British Gaming
Association. The Times (London), Dec. 16, 1968, at 3, col. f. He also sought a contempt
action against Quinton Hogg, M.P., for his article in Punch, which had blamed the judi-
cial system for the failure to prosecute casinos succcessfully. See supra note 47 and ac-
companying text. In Regina v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner ex parte Blackburn
(No. 2), [1968] 2 All E.R. 319, Lord Denning stated this was "the first case, so far as I
know, where this court has been called on to consider an allegation of contempt against
itself." Id. at 320.
64. The Times (London) Apr. 19, 1968, at 3, col. g; The Times (London), June 20,
1968, at 1, col. b. The gaming association explained that "[wle must have a legal view on
whether giving away one's money at a casino makes it an unlawful game." The Times
(London), May 9, 1968, at 2, col. f.
65. Victoria Sporting Club Ltd. v. Hannan; Wynberg v. Hannan, [1969] 1 All E.R.
369; sub nom. Victoria Sporting Club v. Hannan; Wynberg v. Hannan, 113 Sol. J. 122.
66. Id.
67. The Times (London), May 9, 1968, at 2, col. f. The decision was affirmed by the
Divisional Court in October 1968 by 2 to 1 since the odds were not "equally favourable"
to all the players because "the reality of the position is that at any session of gaming it is
conducted in such a way that the odds are thirty-five to one and not thirty-six to
one..." (emphasis added). Id. Thus there was a violation of Section 32(1)(a)(ii) of the
Betting, Gaming and Lotteries Act of 1963. The House of Lords in January of 1969 af-
firmed the decision in part on different grounds. Victoria Sporting Club Ltd. v. Hannan
[1969] 1 All E.R. 369.
68. Regina v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner ex parte Blackburn, Law Report,
The Times (London), July 20, 1968, at 7, col. f. (Salmon, L.J.).
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curtail casinos since the January court decision. 9 At a hearing before
the court, Blackburn claimed that parliamentary figures proved the
clubs took in over "£2,500,000 a year in foreign currency alone. Some-
thing more than a £100 fine was needed. '70 Moreover, Blackburn com-
plained that enforcement was delayed by six month trials and three
month appeals; immediate relief was necessary. Lord Justice Salmon
concluded that injunctive relief was appropriate, especially because
gaming was a "public evil" and precedent allowed such relief when
mere fines did not prevent the law from "being flouted."
7
'
Lord Denning remarked that the prosecution had vigorously tried
to enforce the law, but that most club owners ignored both the court
warning in January and the notice of the Chief Metropolitan Magis-
trate's decision that marker chips in roulette were illegal.72 A £200
penalty was no deterrent, and imprisonment for a second offense was
inapplicable since the "owners were limited companies, which had no
body to be imprisoned and no soul to be damned.
73
Lord Denning believed that the appropriate remedy was a relator
action by-the Attorney General for an injunction, but the Director of
Public Prosecution had earlier told Blackburn that injunctive relief
was inappropriate "at this stage." Lord Justice Salmon, agreeing that
the Commissioner had done all that was possible, was unsatisfied with
the director's explanation that injunctive relief was inappropriate since
otherwise "it was difficult to think when that stage would arise. Was it
to be in another seven years, or seven months, or when?"7" Lord Jus-
tice Davies also agreed that an injunction in the case at bar was appro-
priate since gaming evils were concededly "great, the profits accruing
to the exploiters immense, the penalties normally imposed trifling and
its suppression accordingly a matter of great public urgency.
7
1
69. The Times (London) July 20, 1968, at 7, col. e.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. The Times (London), July 25, 1968, at 12, col. d. Lord Denning has stated, "[als
to injunctive relief, you are quite right in thinking the Court was in fact only one step
away from granting it. I myself was in favour of it." Letter from Lord Denning to the
author (Aug. 19, 1985).
73. The Times (London), July 20, 1968, at 7, col. e. In Huckerby v. Elliott, 113 Sol. J.
1001 (Q.B 1969), a director of a club where chemin de fer was played did not have the
necessary license required by Section 13 of the Finance Act of 1966. The court held that
a director had no duty ". . .to exercise some degree of control over what was happening;
nor was it right to say that there was a duty to supervise the running of the com-
pany. ." Id. at 193-194.
74. The Times (London), July 25, 1968, at 12, col. d.
75. Law Not Powerless to Stop Illegal Gaming, The Times (London), July 25, 1968,
at 13, col. d. The motion was dismissed, but the court refused the Commissioner's re-
quest to assess costs against Blackburn. In October 1968, Blackburn requested the Attor-
ney General grant him a fiat for injunctive relief against a casino located in Home Secre-
tary Callaghan's constituency. The Times (London), Oct. 22, 1968, at 2, col. b; Former
MP seeks Gaming Inquiry, The Times (London), Nov. 6, 1968, at 3, col. b.
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Blackburn's lawsuits and the earlier Kursaal decision led some to
speculate that a new gaming act was unnecessary. One Tory parliamen-
tarian feared that the Blackburn decision of January 1968 had con-
vinced the government that even reform of existing laws was unneces-
sary. 6 In fact, the proposed Act was published on December 19, 1967,
the same day as the Kursaal decision, an event which anti-gaming sup-
porters believed was "extraordinary ill luck.
77
The Government temporarily deferred the bill and there were re-
ports that "anxious" consultations "were taking place with the police
and doubtless their own legal advisors."78 It was argued that if the po-
lice enforced the law, Britain's 1,000 casinos would face "virtual extinc-
tion."79 Immediately after the Kursaal decision, James Callaghan, the
Government Home Secretary, declared privately that the bill was now
unnecessary because the whole picture was altered."0 Shortly thereaf-
ter, at the end of January, Dick Taverne, Q.C., Under-Secretary at the
Home Office, and the person regarded as the author of the bill, con-
vened an informal conference of the chief constables of English cities.
They predicted that if the laws against games of unequal chance were
enforced, organized crime would benefit from the inevitable under-
ground gaming." Thus, the Government decided to proceed with the
bill as the less undesirable alternative between "outright suppression
and a most rigorous control." '82 Anti-gaming zealots thought that the
76. 758 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1182 (1968).
77. The Times (London), Jan. 2, 1968, at 7, col. a. The bill was initially introduced as
a private member's bill by William Rees-Davies. 755 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1444
(1967).
78. Examining the Home Office's Gambling Dilemma, The Times (London), Feb. 2,
1968, at 9, col. e.
79. Gaming Clubs are Facing "Day of Reckoning", The Times (London), Jan. 30,
1968, at 1, col. a.
80. Interview with Dick Taverne (July 19, 1985). The Times (London), Feb. 2, 1968,
at 9, col. e.
81. Interview with Dick Taverne, (July 19, 1985). Mark Carlisle, M.P., a Tory, con-
gratulated Taverne "whose brain child I suspect the Bill to be." 758 PABL. DEB., H.C. (5th
ser.) 1210 (1968). As early as December 1966, the Labor Ministry discussed the need to
"control the activities of this vast and dangerous new (gaming) industry." CROSSMAN,
supra note 26, at 169.
82. 758 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1169 (1968). Lord Denning credits Blackburn with
being responsible for the 1968 Act. Not only was the Act the result of forces outside
Blackburn, but it was his activity and the Kursaal decision which might have made the
Act unnecessary. The Times (London) Feb. 14, 1968, at 1, col. g. G.N. Benson also agrees
that as a result of Blackburn's efforts, the Home Secretary did at one time contemplate
not proceeding with the Gaming Act. Gaming Act, 1968, 112 Sol. J. 978 (1968). After the
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"choice" was "manifest nonsense.""s Less biased observers concluded
that the prospect of withdrawing the bill and driving gaming again un-
derground would have resulted in "an inaugural gift from Mr. Calla-
ghan" to organized crime with the consequences of "prohibition in Chi-
cago in the 1920's." s
II. THE GAMING ACT OF 1968
The Gaming Act of 1968 is divided into four parts and twelve
schedules. Part I essentially deals with casinos, and "the general law
restricting gaming."8' Part II deals with games of chance, and a com-
plex licensing system for proprietary clubs "controlled by the Gaming
Board" and the registration of member clubs where gaming is only "a
purely incidental activity.""s Part III exclusively concerns gaming ma-
chines, their licensing and registration and Part IV consists of "Miscel-
laneous and Supplementary Provisions."87 The Act also has twelve
schedules for purposes of implementation. It was described by the
Home Secretary as "a long Bill and a complicated one."88
A. Casino Licensing
One of the Act's most crucial and innovative features was the pro-
cedure created for the licensing of proprietary gaming clubs. Through-
out the debates, the overwhelmingly supported goal was to drastically
Blackburn decision, Callaghan invited Denning to discuss the reform of the proposed
Bill. DENNING, supra note 57, at 122. In a letter to the author, Denning stated that at the
meeting,
I did indeed explain the complexity of the situation to him and he put for-
ward to me his proposals for a licensing system and I gave him my support,
saying that I thought and hoped it would work well. I may add that it was very
unusual for him as Home Secretary to discuss the position with me as a Judge,
because in general we here are opposed to any discussions of the executive Gov-
ernment with the Judges. I am sure in the case the discussion was a help to him
in framing his new legislation.
Letter from Lord Denning to the author (Aug. 19, 1985).
83. Letter from Raymond Blackburn to the Editor, The Times (London), Feb. 6,
1968, at 9, col. f. The Solicitors Journal listed the two choices as "oppression" or "most
rigorous control." 112 Sol. J. 978 (1968). Hogg, considered the Bill as "the least un-
hopeful approach if we are not to return to virtual total prohibition." Political Parley,
PUNCH, Feb. 14, 1968, at 232.
84. THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 3, 1968, at 15, col. 2.
85. BOARD REPORT (1969), supra note 19, at para. 4.
86. 758 PARL. DES., H.C. (5th ser.) 175 (1968).
87. Gaming Act 1968, ch. 65, § 40 et seq.
88. 758 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1180 (1968).
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reduce the number of casinos by two-thirds or three-quarters. 9 The
Government envisioned casinos eventually having to surmount a three
"sieve" obstacle. First, the Gaming Board would have the power to
deny certificates of consent. Second, the Board could oppose a license
before local licensing justices, and third, the Board could appeal a li-
cense if it was granted over the Board's objections.9 In effect, the Act
created "a preliminary filtering conducted by the Board and a substan-
tive determination by the licensing authority." 91
First, the Board would pass on the "trustworthiness of all appli-
cants and their financial sponsors. 9 2 After "a great number. . . fall at
the first hurdle, ' 93 the remaining applicants would then go before the
licensing justices where many would be rejected for unsuitability of
premises, lack of demand or other reasons. 4
If, notwithstanding the Board's opposition, the justices granted a
license, the Board would have "quite unprecedented" appellate pow-
ers."' "They will not be restricted in their appeals to cases where they
have themselves appeared in the first instance, but will be able to take
up and champion, on appeal, objections made by any other party what-
soever-for instance, the police, the local authority, the fire authority,
residents' associations, or even single individuals."96
1. Certificate of Consent
The prerequisite to obtaining a casino license is a certificate of
consent from the Board. For this certificate, the Board requires only
that applicants apply either for a bingo or casino license and that they
satisfy the "absolute" statutory requirements of age, citizenship and
residency.' 7 In practice, "the Board [is) required to make unusually ex-
tensive inquiries not only into the capacity and diligence of all appli-
cants, but also into their character, reputation, financial standing and
any other circumstances appearing to the Board to be relevant."' In
89. 293 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 905 (1968).
90. 296 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 461-462 (1968).
91. Playboy Club of London, Ltd. v. Gaming Board of Great Britain, No. SJ 216/8
(Q.B. July 14, 1980) (available on LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases file).
92. 296 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 460 (1968).
93. Id. at 461.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 462. The Board might approve an applicant's fitness, but oppose a license
before local justices for different reasons, e.g. lack of unstimulated demand.
96. Id.
97. Objection Sustained, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 17, 1970, at 21, col. 2.
98. Rogers v. Secretary of State for the Home Department; Gaming Board for Great
Britain v. Rogers 11972] 2 All E.R. 1057, 1059 (H.L.); aff'g sub nor. Regina v. Lewes
Justices, ex parte the Gaming Board of Great Britain; Regina v. Lewes Justices, ex parte
the Secretary of State for the Home Department, [19711 2 All E.R. 1126 (Q.B.); sub nom.
Regina v. Lewes Justices, ex parte Home Secretary, 115 Sol. J. 306 (emphasis added).
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addition to ensuring that the applicants have sufficient financial re-
sources, available management expertise and good character, the Board
must form an "opinion" as to whether applicants are "likely to be ca-
pable of, and diligent in, securing that the provisions of this Act and of
any regulations made under it will be complied with, [and] that gaming
on the premises will be fairly and properly conducted. . . . ""' A cor-
porate applicant must also supply "statements of the assets and liabili-
ties of its directors and of the nature of the shareholding."' 00 The
Board is especially concerned that an applicant not be a "front" for
those who would otherwise be unacceptable. 10 1
The Government explained in Parliament why standards for a cer-
tificate of consent were vague:
Formally, a person applying for a certificate of consent. . . is
required to do no more than specify the premises concerned
and say whether the application he intends to make to the jus-
tices will be for a bingo club license or another. But the Board
will probably ask for other information bearing upon the appli-
cant's record, experience, resources and backing. The nature of
the information that will be sought is likely to vary in different
cases. It would be unnecessary and perhaps hampering to the
Board to attempt a comprehensive description.'2
Courts, however, would be able to review a Board decision only:
[11f it appears that the laws of natural justice have been disre-
garded. This will mean, at the least, that if the Board were
99. Sched. 2, para. 4 (5) of the Gaming Act, 1968 provides:
Subject to sub-paragraph (4) of this paragraph, in determining whether to
issue to an applicant a certificate consenting to his applying for the grant of a
license under this Act in respect of any premises, the Board shall have regard
only to the question whether, in their opinion, the applicant is likely to be capa-
ble of, and diligent in, securing that the provisions of this Act and of any regula-
tions made under it will be complied with, that gaming on those premises will be
fairly and properly conducted, and that the premises will be conducted without
disorder or disturbance.
100. Miers, supra note 5, at 41.
101. GAMING BOARD FOR GREAT BRITAIN, SIXTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT para. 90 (1984)
[hereinafter BOARD REPORT (1984)]. Should a significant change occur in a corporation's
shareholders (5% or more), and should the Board not approve of the change, the license
holder would face the grave probability of a non-renewal of his license. Interview with
Geoffrey Littman, Esq., (Jan. 8, 1987).
102. 766 PARL. DEa., H.C. (5th ser.) 315 (1968); The Times (London) Aug. 7, 1969, at
2, col. a.
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minded to refuse a certificate it would be expected, first, to
give the applicant a general indication of the nature of the ob-
jections and an opportunity of answering them. It does not fol-
low that it would have to reveal its sources of information, or
that, in arriving at its decision, it would be bound by the same
laws of evidence or proof as a court of law. While mitigated by
the requirements of natural justice, the system will still remain
essentially arbitrary.03
Conservatives preferred a totally powerful Board. As one Tory ex-
plained, "many of us who are lawyers came to the view that [the
Board] should be wholly arbitrary.'10 4 The Conservatives also agreed
that "within the limits of natural justice, the Board will have the
power to say, 'No, you shall not.' It will not have to state its rea-
sons."' 5 In fact, the opposition only asked that an applicant be al-
lowed to make written representations to the Board before a
decision.'0 6
The Board explained its procedure, which the Act had left for the
Board's determination, before the hearing process for a certificate of
consent was implemented. If its staff recommended an applicant be
denied a certificate, the Board would then interview the applicant.
When consistent with the Board's statutory duty and the public inter-
est, the Board would make the applicant aware of the matters that
were troubling it.10 7 The Board would also allow a hearing in which the
applicant could be represented by legal counsel or other experts. One
such applicant brought twelve witnesses to a hearing, while another
lasted seven hours.' 8
The Board insisted it would not reveal information or sources
which might endanger the obtaining of further information, nor would
it permit an applicant to make a verbatim record of the hearing.'0 9 As
one Board member explained, the Board's interviews of applicants
were often an "alarming exercise" due to the "high proportion of peo-
ple in the industry who are the possessors of a criminal past" and be-
cause "some [applicants] have been utterly dumbfounded that the
Board should take an interest in their housebreaking expeditions 15
years ago.""' The Board also refused to give specific reasons for a de-
103. 766 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 317 (1968).
104. Id. at 320.
105. Id. at 318.
106. Id. at 320.
107. The Times (London), Jan. 14, 1970, at 3, col. b.
108. BOARD REPORT (1969), supra note 19, at para. 93.
109. Meirs, supra note 5, at 59 n.41.
110. Bacon, supra note 23, at 260.
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nial of a certificate. If a decision was unfavorable, it was up to the
applicants to decide "whether they want to make public the [contro-
versial] issues." ' Furthermore, any appeal could only be based on the
grounds of a denial of "natural justice."
The initial test case for the Board's certificate of consent proce-
dure was Regina v. Gaming Board for Great Britain ex parte
Benaim,"' which upheld the Board's denial of a certificate to
Crockford's, England's largest casino and "the club that did the most
to establish gaming in Britain."' 3 In their initial appearance before the
Board on December 1, 1969, Crockford's joint-managing heads, Benaim
and Khaida, were informed that the Board had "grave doubts about
their application."1 " " After a four-hour meeting, the applicants claimed
they were told that the Board was "quite satisfied" about their reputa-
tions, but that they could submit additional written relevant informa-
tion. On January 9, 1970, the Board denied their application without
giving any reasons. When Benaim and Khaida requested more infor-
mation, the Board cited five factors which had troubled it, but refused
to say which factors had .been answered satisfactorily. The applicants
then sought an order to quash the Board's decision and an order of
mandamus requiring it to explain its reasons for refusal. On March 4,
1970, the Queens Bench Divisional Court denied the applicants' re-
quest and concluded "that it was unarguable that there should be any
such judicial review.""' The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal
for an order of certiorari to quash the Board's decision." 6
At the initial hearing, the applicants suggested that the Board uti-
lized factors outside of those listed in schedule 2 paragraph 4(5),17
which emphasized that gaming on an applicant's premise be "fairly
and properly conducted."' 16 The applicants claimed that the courts
should give the Board "some general guidance" in order for the Board
to carry out its obligations to be fair." 9 The applicants further argued
that if the Board prevailed, not only would their names be blackened,
but it would be impossible for them to sell the premises to someone
else. In addition, it was unfair not to indicate "the specific matters" of
111. The Times (London), Jan. 14, 1970, at 3, col. b. Cline, Zero for Crockford's,
Spectator, Mar. 14, 1970, at 333, col. 1.
112. [1970] 2 All E.R. 528, (C.A.).
113. The Times (London), Apr. 1, 1970, at 8, col. d.
114. The Times (London), Mar. 5, 1970, at 14, col. d.
115. Id.
116. Id. Cline stressed that the appellate court insisted the matter was arguable.
Cline, supra note 27, at 333.
117. See supra note 99.
118. Id.
119. The Times (London), Mar. 5, 1970, at 14, col. e.
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dissatisfaction since otherwise applicants would be looking "for a nee-
dle in a haystack"' 20 or "shadow-boxing, unable to answer a case which
had not been put against it."''
Lord Justice Phillimore initially expressed concern "because obvi-
ously the Board [has] got a lot of information from all over the
place-maybe police information. That information is not always right
and it is very difficult, unless you know what it is that they are secretly
accusing you of.' ' 2 2 In denying applicants' relief after three days of
argument, Lord Denning, with the approval of the other two justices,
concluded that the operation of a casino and other gaming was a privi-
lege, "which required the applicants. . . to show that they are fit to be
trusted with it.' 2
3
In dicta, the Benaim Court stressed that the public policy of the
Act necessitated coping with organized crime. The Board need only
give the applicant an outline of its reservations and "their opinion as
to the capability and diligence of the applicant.' ' 2 The Court, how-
ever, concluded that the "matter was arguable and denied the Board's
assertion that it had, in effect, unfettered discretion and thus could
disregard the rules of natural justice."'12 Lord Denning emphasized
that "the Board must be fair; [if not], these courts will not hesitate to
interfere.1 26 It was further emphasized that the principles of natural
justice were applicable both to administrative proceedings and to the
granting of licenses.' While it was impossible to lay down rigid rules
concerning natural justice, or its scope and extent, natural justice en-
compassed a right to be heard and to be treated fairly.2 8 In effect,
120. Id.
121. Cline, supra note 27, at 333, col. 1.
122. The Times (London), Mar. 5, 1970, at 14, col. e.
123. Benaim, [1970] 2 All E.R. at 533; The Times (London), Mar. 19, 1970, at 4,
col. g.
124. [1970] 2 All E.R. at 535 (emphasis original).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 533. In later analyzing this case Lord Denning stressed its importance as a
decision which subjected administrative decisions to judicial review. DENNING, supra note
57, at 92-93.
128. In Regina v. Herrod, [1976], 1 All E.R. 273, 280 (C.A.), Lord Denning said that
the Act had a provision:
enabling the local authorities in some circumstances to pass policy resolutions
declaring that they would issue no more permits in respect of premises of a spec-
ified class. Such resolutions can be passed by the local authorities without hear-
ing the persons affected and without giving them any right of appeal. In short,
the local authorities are authorized to pass resolutions by which they can give a
'blanket' refusal to grant or renew a permit without hearing the applicant and
without any appeal from their decision. This would seem to be contrary to natu-
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gaming applicants' rights were analogized to those of an immigrant at a
deportation hearing.
1 29
The need for nondisclosure by the Board was further strengthened
by the House of Lords' unanimous decision in Rogers v. Home Secre-
tary; Gaming Board for Great Britain v. Rogers.130 That decision es-
tablished that the public interest required information received by the
Board about applicants to remain undisclosed. Otherwise, disclosure to




Courts reached results similar to those in Benaim in Regina v.
Gaming Board for Great Britain ex parte Wise 32 and Penthouse
Clubs (International) Ltd.13 In Penthouse, the Board denied a certifi-
cate after four or five meetings with the applicant. On appeal, the ap-
plicant alleged unfairness and inadequate notice of the matters to be
discussed. Penthouse argued that if it had been aware of the specific
areas of Board concern, it could have given detailed responses.1" In
February of 1979, when the Divisional Court refused to quash the
Board's decision, another unsuccessful appeal was made to the Euro-
ral justice, even in the application for the 'grant' of a permit. All the more so
where it is the refusal to 'renew' an existing license.
In McInnes v. Onslow Fane and Another, [1978] 3 All E.R. 211, Sir Robert Megarry,
V.C., explained the difficulty of utilizing 'natural justice' as a test. "The suitability of the
term 'fairness' in such cases is increased by the curiosities of the expression 'natural
justice.' Justice is far from being a 'natural' concept. The closer one goes to a state of
nature the less justice does one find." Id. at 219.
129. [19701 2 All E.R. 532-535 (C.A.). When leave to appeal to the House of Lords
was denied, Crockford's closed from March, 1970 until it was reopened by new owners in
May, 1971. The Times (London) May 26, 1971, at 1, col. e.
130. [1972] 2 All E.R. 1057 (H.L. 1973).
131. Parliament, moreover, specifically exempted the Board from the requirements of
The Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 (exceptions) Order 1975, which would treat a
rehabilitated person as if he had never committed the offense, and therefore remove any
convictions from his record. GAMING BOARD FOR GREAT BRITAIN, SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT
para. 14 (1974) [hereinafter BOARD REPORT (1974)]; Board Report (1975), supra note 49,
at para. 11.
132. Q.B. Div'l Ct. February 25, 1975, as cited in, BOARD REPORT (1975), supra note
49, at para. 42.
133. GAMING BOARD FOR GREAT BRITAIN, ELEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT para. 38 (1979)
[hereinafter BOARD REPORT (1979)]. The Times (London), July 19, 1979, at 36, col. c.
134. A different solicitor who succeeded in obtaining a certificate of consent was nev-
ertheless bitter after its hearing procedure. During a fifteen-minute interview, his client
was informed he had been seen in his car with "a certain character of alleged ill repute."
Not only had the applicant sold his car, but also proved that it was another person who
had a general appearance and a Jaguar similar to the one mentioned by the Board. "If
my client was refused his certificate, his £80,000 business would have been virtually
worthless with no right of appeal." England, Gaming Board, 114 Sol. J. 391 (1970).
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pean Commission of Human Rights." 5
Contrary to Benaim, the Court in Regina v. Gaming Board for
Great Britain ex parte Fenton, et al., 3 ' distinguished earlier rulings
whereby natural justice or fairness meant only that the Board disclose
non-confidential information. As a result of the decision, the Board
adopted a policy of indicating by letter the topics which were of con-
cern to it. While the Board, prior to Fenton, revealed as much of the
information from confidential sources as consistent with its need to
protect its sources, it was observed that:
the Board will mention a name or an event at the hearing with-
out any prior notice to which the applicant is expected to re-
spond. He may not have the slightest knowledge of the person
or event; or, if he does, he may not have ready to hand the
material upon which he can satisfactorily answer the Board's
inquiry. And since it may not reveal the motive to its bald in-
quiry, it is hard for the applicant to know how to deal with the
Board's misgivings, whatever they may be." 7
At a minimum, Fenton required that: "(i) prior notice ought to be
given indicating clearly the areas of complaint; (ii) the proceedings
should be so conducted that justice should not only be done but seem
to be done; and (iii) the view of the Board that no irregularity had
occurred should not be the decisive factor."'""
135. Penthouse Club International Ltd. Eur. Comm'n H.R. 5 (Application No. 8847/
80, 1981). Benjamin Baker, the solicitor for Penthouse, insisted that "had we any idea of
their objections which concerned remote activity in Spain, we would have been able to
answer the questions satisfactorily." Interview with Benjamin Baker (July 16, 1985).
Penthouse, as a result of the Benaim decision, decided that further appellate review
within Great Britain would be "futile." Penthouse Club International Limited Case, Eur.
Comm'n. H.R. 5 (Application No. 8847/80, 1981). Instead, Penthouse argued that the
British decisions violated Article 6 of the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in that it was a violation of civil rights or obligations.
On May 5, 1981, the Commission concluded Article 6 was inapplicable to Gaming Board
proceedings. Id.
136. Financial Times, Feb. 5, 1979, at 10, col. c.
137. "The Europeans have traditionally regarded it as axiomatic that every decision
of a court of law or an administrative tribunal should be fully articulated and reasoned."
Safeguards for the Gaming Board, Financial Times, February 5, 1979, at 10, col. c. Re-
gina v. Gaming Board of Great Britain ex parte Fenton et al., held that natural justice
necessitated full disclosure and prior notice of all matters of concern to the Board. The
Court's decision on natural justice has been interpreted therefore as having the potential
of "stav[ing] off some applicants' trips to Strasbourg." Safeguards for the Gaming
Board, supra. As a result of Fenton, the Board now discloses to applicants, in advance,
what it will discuss at the hearing for a certificate of consent.
138. Gaming: Revocation of Certificate, 129 NEW L.J. 148 (1978). The decision is es-
pecially significant since the issue was the withdrawal of certificates of approval by the
Board of Casino executives. Parliament had been especially critical of any due process
rights concerning the withdrawal of these certificates.
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Unfettered Board discretion was further criticized in Playboy Club
of London, Ltd. v. Gaming Board of Great Britain.' For nine months,
until the appellate court had decided issues concerning possible revo-
cation of the Victoria Sporting Club's license, the Board refused to
transfer a certificate of consent to Playboy. It also refused to hold a
hearing on whether the license of the embattled Victoria's Sporting
Club could be transferred to its purchaser, Playboy. 4"
The Divisional Court held that irrespective of Board discretion
and the concept that gaming was a privilege, once a certificate or li-
cense was granted, the Act "contemplates" a certificate upon compli-
ance, therefore, it would be an "absurdity" for the Board to "confer on
itself a wholly unfettered discretion, forming no part of the enacted
scheme, by the simple expectant of refusing to listen to an application
at all."'' Even if the Act were silent, the Board had an implied duty to
decide based on sched. 2, para. 4(3), which specifically lists those appli-
cations on which the Board need not act, "thereby inferentially sug-
gesting that other types of applications must at least be considered."' 4
Benaim, was cited as authority "that the Board is under a duty to act,
and to act fairly, when a consent application is received.' 4
3
2. License Application and the "Mirror Image" Requirement
During the time between having obtained a consent certificate and
the license hearing, an applicant often had to face another potentially
serious obstacle. It had been common practice by lawyers for compet-
ing gaming interests to "kill an application" by "technical objections"
relating to procedural irregularities in complying with required notice
publication.'44 These objections have become less frequent since courts
no longer insist upon "mirror image" compliance. The incentive to re-
move a potential competitor has also been reduced by a change in law





143. Gaming: Gaming Board's Duty, 130 NEW L.J. 1009-1010 (1980). See GAMING
BOARD FOR GREAT BRITAIN, TWELFTH ANNUAL REPORT para. 10 (1980) [hereinafter BOARD
REPORT (1980)]. Shortly thereafter, the Board issued Playboy a certificate of consent,
The Times (London), July 22, 1980, at 3 col. c; Gaming: Gaming Board's Duty, supra, at
1010. "That went far beyond the bounds of matters which could properly be taken into
account by the Board where making a procedural decision whether a substantive decision
should be made now or at a later date." Id.
144. Kent-Lemon, supra note 2, at 77.
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which permits granting quarterly license applications. 4" A successful
objector may no longer automatically eliminate a potential competitor
for at least a year, imposing on him the additional burden of re-apply-
ing for a consent certificate. 46
Early decisions invalidated applications when a published notice
included the entire application (a common practice in liquor licensing)
instead of only the required statutory material. 4 7 In Regina v. Bourne-
mouth Gaming Licensing Committee ex parte Dominion Leisure
Ltd.,148 a license was denied because the notice "was displayed outside
the proposed entrance to the premises rather than outside the existing
entrance" to the relevant premises. 49 A gaming application was also
rejected when the applicant sent the cutting instead of "a copy of that
newspaper" to the licensing committee thirteen days from the time of
publication, instead of "not later than seven days after the publica-
tion."' 0 In 1976, two license applications were dismissed without a
hearing. In both cases, the applicants utilized "the Premises known as
'The . . .Casino' instead of 'a Club named' the . . .Casino" pursuant
to sched. 2 (6)(2).151 In its annual report for 1977, the Board further
emphasized that "at least 10 applications" were denied for technical
defects.'
Recent judicial decisions have tended to discard the mirror-image
requirements for what, in effect, amounts to substantial compliance. In
Regina v. Brighton Gaming Licensing Committee ex parte Cotedale,'8 3
competitors objected to a notice which included the name and address
of the applicant's secretary. This, it was argued, was a violation of
sched. 2(5)(4) and 2(6)(4), which prohibited in the notice "any matter
which is not required ... "4 In allowing the applicant's mandamus
request, Lord Denning emphasized that the objection "was a most
145. The Gaming Act, 1968, as amended by Act of April 28, 1982.
146. FINNEY, supra note 3, at 130.
147. Regina v. Leicester Gaming Licensing Committee ex parte Shine; [1971] 1
W.L.R. 1648 (Q.B.); aff'g [1971] 1 W.L.R. 1216; (Div'l Ct.). "Any departure from the
code prima facie rendered ineffective a step in the procedure in which an error was
made." Case Notes, 121 NEW L.J. 502 (1971).
148. Divisional Court, (Oct. 18, 1978) (interpreting scheds. 2(6), and (7) of the 1968
Act). See FINNEY, supra note 3, at 130.
149. Id. at 131.
150. Regina v. Pontypool Gaming Licensing Committee ex parte Risca Cinemas
[1970] 3 All E.R. 241. (Div'l Ct.)
151. BOARD REPORT (1976), supra note 39, at para. 39 (emphasis original).
152. GAMING BOARD FOR GREAT BRITAIN, NINTH ANNUAL REPORT para. 39 (1977)
[hereinafter BOARD REPORT (1977)].
153. [1978] 3 All E.R. 897 (C.A.).
154. Id. See also, FINNEY, supra note 3, at 131.
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technical one," that nobody "has been misled" and that "the require-
ments [were] fulfilled in substance."' 5 Sir David Cairns also stressed
that sched. 2(5)(4) should not be construed so as to allow "purely for-
malistic objections.'15 6
3. Substantive Requirements
(a) Showing Unsatisfied Demand
After having obtained a certificate of consent, which now is consid-
ered by "most serious applicants" to be the "simple part" in obtaining
a license,157 and after complying with statutory notice requirements,
the applicant must next obtain a license from the relevant local jus-
tices. As with the requirements for a certificate of consent, Parliament
made the licensing requirements a difficult obstacle to overcome if the
authorities were negative.5 8
The appropriate application hearing before the justices might take
as little as a day or as long as three weeks. Often the applicant will
have as many as twenty professional gamblers testify:
that they wish to gamble in the casino being proposed and for
various reasons do not wish to play in other casinos in London.
These reasons may include overcrowding, unsuitability, bad at-
mosphere, type of ownership, wrong location, the mix of facili-
ties available in competitor casinos, etc. This positive and
forceful evidence, which is often hard to challenge by the oppo-
sition, will almost inevitably be the crux of any new license
application." 9
At the hearings, the Gaming Board, in practice, appears as an ad-
155. [1978] 3 All E.R. at 899. See also Regina v. Newcastle-upon-Tyne Gaming Li-
censing Committee ex parte White Hart Enterprises [1977] 3 All E.R. 961. The issue was
whether the statutory "displayed" outside necessitated being "affixed" outside. Regina v.
Newcastle-upon-Tyne Gaming Licensing Committee ex parte White Hart Enterprises,
Case Notes, 127 NEW L.J. 791 (1977). The White Hart court held that a notice which was
visible to outside passers-by, but appeared inside, was sufficiently "displayed" so as to be
in compliance with sched. 2 (6)(3).
156. Regina v. Brighton Gaming Licensing Committee ex parte Cotedale, [1978] 3 All
E.R., 897, 900.
157. Kent-Lemon, supra note 2, at 77. Miers, supra note 5, considers the certificate
to be "the most substantial hurdle." Id. at 40.
158. 269 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 462 (1968). See also KENT-LEMON, A PRACTICAL
GUIDE TO NEW CASINO LICENSE APPLICATIONS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 3-8. (1984).
159. KENT-LEMON, supra note 158, at 5. The witnesses are subject to cross-examina-
tion and their testimony is taken most seriously by local magistrates. Interview with
Nigel Kent-Lemon (July 15, 1985).
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versary to the applicant. 60 However, unlike the oft-criticized secrecy of
the certificate procedure, the Board will inform the applicant with
specificity as to its intentions and information."6 ' As part of this proce-
dure, the justices must take into account the Board's advice.' 62
Normally, "the crucial test" for the applicant at the hearing "is
proving the existence of unsatisfied demand.' 6 3 Yet, it was not until
1972 that the Board felt it had the expertise to decide whether existing
facilities had already met the demand.'
4
The first significant "test" case concerning "demand" was Regina
v. Manchester Crown Court ex parte Cambos Enterprises, '6 where the
Divisional Court reversed the Crown Court's decision to deny a bingo
license to an applicant. The Court in Cambos affirmed the necessity for
local analysis not only of the quantity, but also of the quality of facili-
ties and remanded the matter to the Crown Court which then allowed
a license.' 6  As a result of Cambos, the Board instructed licensing au-
thorities "to take into consideration the standard of the facilities" pro-
posed, which will encourage a licensee "to improve the quality of the
amenities provided for their patrons."'6 7
The "demand" issue still has not been resolved definitively by the
courts. In 1974, the Board, after analyzing a Scottish decision denying
a bingo license, concluded it was "glad to have judicial support for our
contention that ability to create demand (which is sufficient to make a
160. The Board, in deciding a certificate does not take into account structural suita-
bility of the proposed premises, but only the character and reputation of the applicant.
"This distinction has produced some odd quirks, since the Board has found itself unable
to withhold a certificate from the proprietor of a tatty "dive" on account of his blameless
character while refusing one to a shady person running a lavish, Ritz-like casino." Bacon,
supra note 23, at 259. See also BOARD REPORT (1969), supra note 19, at para. 8.
161. In the opinion of an expert, the Board "will leave few stones unturned in trying
to upset an applicant's case." KENT-LEMON, supra note 158, at 7.
162. One Tory expressed reservations about an applicant only being shown the advice
given to the justices by the Board in that all advice should be "public, published and
available to ensure predictability." 758 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1255, 1256 (1968).
163. MONOPOLIES COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, at para. 2.15. Proving unsatisfied
or unstimulated demand was the test set up by the Betting and Gaming Act of 1960 for
off-track-betting. A bookmaker, to get a license, had to prove demand and usually ex-
isting area bookmakers objected. KENT-LEMON, supra note 158, at 3.
164. In 1972, the Board concluded it had the ability to assess demand. GAMING
BOARD FOR GREAT BRITAIN, FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT at paras. 32-33 (1973). [hereinafter
BOARD REPORT (1973)]; BOARD REPORT (1972), supra note 39, at para. 51.
165. 117 Sol. J. 222; The Times (London) Mar. 5, 1973, at 14, col. a (Q.B. Div'l Ct.
1973). Lord Widgery described schedule 2 as not "altogether easy to understand" and
that paragraph 18 is "in a somewhat odd form with slightly odd phraseology." Id.
166. FINNEY, supra note 3, concluded that instead of clarifying para. 18, Cambos was
"in a sense, all things to all men." Id. at 136.
167. BOARD REPORT (1973), supra, note 164, at para. 15.
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proposition commercially profitable) is not to be counted as satisfying
the conditions of already existing demand."'68 In 1979, however, the
Crown Court, upheld by the Divisional Court, reversed a Brighton li-
censing justice's decision to deny a casino license.' 6 9 The licensing au-
thorities, supported by the Board and competitors 7 ' of the applicant,
concluded that the applicants had not provided the necessary proof for
the demand of an additional club in the area. In its decision, the
Crown Court placed determinative emphasis on "respective 'up-mar-




A licensing authority may also refuse a license for other factors,
such as the unsuitability of the premises under sched. 2(20)(1)(a). As a
result of parliamentary changes in the bill, the Board may appear as an
adversary even though it has granted a certificate of consent. 172 The
Government clearly had envisioned that local authorities could review
all casinos for suitability.
1 73
Where the applicant has received permission from the appropriate
planning body, local authorities have enjoyed only mixed success in de-
nying a license on grounds of unsuitability. The Westminster City
Council has declared its extreme reluctance to grant planning permis-
sion for casinos.'" Chelsea and Kensington have adopted a policy of a
general presumption against area casinos because of potential traffic
increases and a general detrimental impact on neighborhood
amenities.'75
Occasionally, citizens groups alone will be able to delay a casino
license and place restrictions upon the casino's operation. When "the
mighty Lonrho group" tried to move its casino, it was initially denied
permission, notwithstanding lack of opposition from either the Board
168. BOARD REPORT (1974), supra note 131, at paras. 62-66.
169. BOARD REPORT (1979), supra note 133, at para. 46.
170. Competitors may appear and give evidence concerning either the lack of de-
mand, or if there is a demand, it is already satisfied by existing casinos. Kent-Lemon,
supra note 2, at 77. See also, The Times (London), Jan. 7, 1981, at 1, col. 6.
171. BOARD REPORT (1979), supra note 133, at para. 46.
172. 766 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 329 (1968). "The Board will build up general
experience over a period and will have valuable advice to give, I trust, to local justices on
the proper layout and character of gaming rooms." Id.
173. 296 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 461 (1968).
174. MONOPOLIES COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, at para. 3.34.
175. Id. Two applicants with planning permission had to appeal to the Secretary of
State to obtain a license. Id.
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or its competitors. 7  Local residents "had successfully prevented the
move both on the grounds of unsuitability of the premises and de-
mand. This was a very unusual decision and in this case reflected on
the highly competent way in which the objectors put forward their
case." 7 7 While Lonrho succeeded on appeal, it had to agree to bus its
staff, and provide off-street parking for patrons. 78
Mayfair residents, "despite environmental objections" were unable
to prevent a transfer of a casino license to Park Lane where the former
Playboy Club was reopened by Lonrho after three years delay. 7 9 The
Victoria Sporting Club was also granted a license despite the objec-
tions of 112 local residents who signed a petition, fearing "a sort of
miniature Las Vegas" and excessive noise.' The only major victory of
citizens' groups has been a Kensington decision which was not
appealed. 18'
(c) The Applicants' Fitness and Propriety
The licensing authority may also refuse to grant a license because
the applicant is not a "fit and proper person."' 82 In practice, there is
no limit as to what factors may be introduced before the licensing
body. For example, in opposing an extension of Playboy's London
Club's license before the Westminster Gaming Licensing Committee,
Raymond Blackburn asked the committee to examine Playboy maga-
zine centerfolds, "arguing that it would be wrong to grant a license to a
club that got members by its 'Playboy philosophy.' "18 Until 1979,
when Playboy and the police objected to the renewal of three of Lad-
broke's casino licenses, the fitness and propriety of a license holder was
rarely tested. 84
4. Appellate Review
If an applicant receives a certificate of consent and a license, with-
out Board approval, the Board has the right to appeal to the Crown
Court. This court includes a judge and four magistrates who were not
176. Kent-Lemon, supra note 2, at 278.
177. KENT-LEMON, supra note 158, at 3.
178. Interview with Nigel Kent-Lemon (July 15, 1985).
179. The Times (London), Jan. 18, 1984, at 22, col. a.
180. The Times (London), May 8, 1970, at 9, col. f.
181. Interview with Nigel Kent-Lemon (July 15, 1985).
182. The Gaming Act, 1968, sched. 20(1)(b).
183. The Times (London), May 1, 1970, at 4, col. b.
184. Miers, supra note 5, at 48; Miers, The Management of Casino Gaming, 21 BRIT.
J. OF CRIM. L. 79-86, at 82 (1981).
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involved in the initial hearing. s5 An appeal to the Crown Court re-
quires the production of all evidence from the licensing court, and al-
lows the introduction of additional evidence.' 6 In practice, however,
the Crown Court "does pay heed to the decision of the justices. "187
In one unusual appeal, the Board took the "unprecedented step"
of appealing the granting of a casino license to Aspinall's, notwith-
standing the Board's failure to object at the original licensing hear-
ing. '8 The Board Secretary explained that the reason for the appeal
was the Board's inability to "cross-examine witnesses at the original
hearing because it had not registered an objection."' On another oc-
casion, after the Board "had bungled the filing of its own objections
(against Ladbroke's) and was barred from participating in the proceed-
ings," it was dependent upon Playboy, a competitor of the applicant,
to litigate on its behalf concerning the license revocation it sought.90
The Act indicates that the decision by the Crown Court shall be
final for the applicant.'9 ' In Tehrani v. Rostron,192 Lord Denning con-
cluded that finality in the 1968 Act did not include an error on a point
of law. In order to appeal a decision from the Crown Court to a higher
court, there must be a finding that there is an arguable point of law.'93
Ladbroke, for example, convinced a Divisional Court to allow an ap-
peal from a Crown Court decision denying its license renewal by insist-
185. KENT-LEMON, supra note 158, at 8.
186. FINNEY, supra note 3, at 89.
187. Id. "I would hesitate, and I would expect any Chairman of quarter sessions to
hesitate long before differing from the local justices who had dealt with the matter in
their locality with the greatest care." Regina v. Knightsbridge Crown Court et al. ex
parte Aspinall Curzon Ltd. No. Co/957/82 (Q.B. 1982), The Times (London) Dec. 16,
1982, at 5, col. f.
188. The Times (London), Oct. 15, 1982, at 2, col. a.
189. Id.
190. The Times (London), Sept. 3, 1980, at 17, col. d.
191. The Gaming Act, 1968, sched. 2 (29)(4) states:
The court of quarter session may by its order allow or dismiss the appeal, or
reverse or vary any part of the decision of the licensing authority, whether the
appeal relates to that part of it or not, and may deal with the application as if it
had been made to the court of quarter session in the first instance; and the judg-
ment of the court of quarter session on the appeal shall be final.
Sched. 7(11)(4) states:
The court of quarter session may by its order allow or dismiss the appeal
and may deal with the application as if it had been made to the court of quarter
session in the first instance; and the judgment of the court of quarter session on
the appeal shall be final.
192. [1971] 3 All E.R. 790 (C.A.); rev'g. [1971] 2 All E.R. 304 (Div'l Ct.). Denning,
however, stressed the importance of local discretion on gaming matters even if local au-
thorities were "at variance" in their interpretation of the 1968 Act. 3 All E.R. at 794, 796.
193. Id. at 794, 796.
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ing that the Crown Court had refused to consider its corporate restruc-
turing; the Divisional Court agreed that Ladbroke raised an "arguable
legal point."' 94
5. License Renewal
Surprisingly, while the Act gives licensing authorities wide discre-
tion to either cancel or refuse a license renewal; there is no halfway
measure, such as suspension.""5 If an applicant obtains a license, irre-
spective of Board opposition, it may still face Board opposition at the
time of license renewal. For example, the Board objected to the re-
newal of the license for Hollier's Casino Club, Manor Casino Ltd. (Isle
of Wight), on the grounds that it "was not a fit and proper person. '"'9 6
When the justices refused to renew the license (May 5, 1983), the licen-
see appealed, but withdrew its appeal on the first day of the hearing
(September 26, 1983), and the casino closed that day.197
The one major restriction of the Board's power over casinos is the
due process protection against Board revocation of a certificate as op-
posed to objecting to a license renewal. The parliamentary opposition
urged either that the Board be allowed revocation power "where gam-
ing on premises is not being fairly and properly conducted" or that
Britain follow the Nevada example and allow the Board "to close a
club within 24 hours.' 98
The Government insisted, however, that allowing the Board to
have full revocation power if there were a violation of licensing condi-
tions "would be too far-reaching" inasmuch as:
194. The Times (London), Dec. 19, 1979, at 3, col. d. "Irrespective of finality," a re-
viewing court will look beyond the lower court order. What can be regarded as being the
record in the transcript has been liberally interpreted by the courts. In Regina v. Knight-
sbridge Crown Court ex parte International Sporting Club, 11981] 3 All E.R. 417 (Q.B.),
it was emphasized, in a decision concerning the cancellation of club gaming licenses, that
the Board was incorrect in claiming that the reviewing court could not look at the lower
court's final order "and not at the reasons that the Court gave for making the order." Id.
. Modern authorities show that the judges have relaxed the strictness of that rule
[concerning the record] and have taken a broader view of the 'record' in order that cer-
tiorari may give relief to those against whom a decision has been given which is based on
a manifest error of law. Id. Yet, in Westminster City Council v. Luntpalm Ltd. (Q. B.
Div'l Ct.), Law Report, The Times (London), Dec. 10, 1985, at 25, col. b, the court held
that Section 28 of the Supreme Court Act, 1981, together with sched. 9 of the Gaming
Act, 1968, prevented an appeal, irrespective of a council resolution containing a double
negative.
195. Kent-Lemon, supra note 2, at 76.
196. BOARD REPORT (1983), supra note 49, at para. 18; Littman, supra note 1, at 240.
197. Littman, supra note 1.
198. Id.
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[T]he justices will be entitled to refuse renewal of a license or
to cancel it, . . . which could satisfactorily be dealt with at a
hearing in open court. If the Board could decide these issues at
its sole discretion this would encroach on the proper jurisdic-
tion of the courts, and would leave the license-holder-and all
his employees-in constant peril of arbitrary process. It would
also involve a substantial transfer of responsibilities of enforce-
ment from the police to the Board's inspectors, who could not
be recruited in sufficient number properly to assume them.'99
One of the most complicated problems the Board faces, arises
when a licensee is denied renewal on the grounds he is not a fit and
proper person 00 and, while the casino remains in operation during an
appeal to the Crown Court, the licensee sells his interest to a third
party. During the appellate process for a license revocation, the de-
fendant casino will often seek to sell out to a third party or drastically
overhaul its corporate structure. In 1979, the Police Commissioner and
the Board requested that the appropriate licensing committee cancel
the licenses of three London casinos controlled by Coral Leisure
Group, Ltd. After cancellation, Coral sold the casinos to Lonrho,
Mecca and Aspinall.
20 1
199. 766 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 338 (1968). Certification, unlike licensing, need
not be renewed and may be revoked only on limited grounds. Gaming Act, 1968, sched.
2(34); sched. 2 paras. 3-7, 19, 42-43. Cancellation of certification is extremely serious
since the justice may issue a disqualification order for up to five years. Gaming Act, 1968,
§ 24(2). The Board has rarely revoked a casino certificate because the grounds are so
narrow it would be almost impossible. Interview with R. Creedon, Civil Servant with the
Gaming Board (July 18, 1985).
200. The Gaming Act, 1968, sched. 2(20)(1) states that "...the licensing authority
may refuse to grant or renew a license under this Act . . .(b) [where] the applicant is
not a fit and proper person to be the holder of a license under this Act .... "
201. In Regina v. Crown Court at Knightsbridge ex parte Marcrest, [1983] 1 All E.R.
1148 (C.A. 1982), the appellate court affirmed the Divisional Court's refusal to allow cor-
porate restructuring to change its decision to cancel and disqualify the casino's certifi-
cate of consent. In Regina v. Knightsbridge Crown Court ex parte International Sporting
Club, [1981] 3 All E.R. 417 (Div'l Ct.), the Divisional Court concluded it was an error of
law for the Crown Court not to have considered the corporate restructuring of the casino.
International Sporting Club, a subsidiary of Lonrho, was granted a license at the Crown
Court hearing. GAMING BOARD FOR GREAT BRITAIN, THIRTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT para. 9
(1981) [hereinafter BOARD REPORT (1981)]. Mecca received a new certificate of consent
and a license. Id. Aspinall's had also applied for a new certificate and license, but the
Board appealed the license to the Crown Court. In Regina v. Knightsbridge Crown Court
ex parte The Aspinall Curzon (Q.B. Div'l Ct.), The Times (London), Dec. 16, 1982, at 5,
col. a, Aspinall's appeal was dismissed because of a lack of unstimulated demand, irre-
spective of both Lonrho and Mecca having obtained licenses.
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B. Other Provisions of the Act
1. Geographical Restrictions
The Board concluded that, in addition to vetoing applications for
a certificate of consent, other means were necessary if it were to accom-
plish the parliamentary goal of drastic reduction in the number of casi-
nos. It decided geographical restrictions were the only viable way to
reduce the number of casinos to the level necessary to carry out its
parliamentary mandate. 2 ' The first major criticism of Board power re-
sulted from its regulatory attempt on July 31, 1969, to drastically re-
duce the number of casinos by restricting them to thirty-one areas (in-
cluding two Welsh and three Scottish areas and essentially "the wicked
square mile"20 3 in London). The criticism was exacerbated because the
regulation, which would result in costly losses by casinos in those ex-
cluded areas, was promulgated while Parliament was in recess.
Members of both major parties criticized the area restriction as
having given "an unreasonable competitive advantage to holiday re-
sorts ... "2 This regulation was also denounced as an improper del-
egation of ministerial power. "The Regulations," explained Enoch
Powell, were an "example of abuse and should be rejected on that
ground."20 It was further denounced as not contemplated by any-
one,20 6 as both "arbitrary" and monopolistic,0 7 and as ultra vires since
demand was the responsibility of licensing authorities and not the
Board.20 8
Surprisingly, the Government responded that the choice of thirty-
one selected areas should not be regarded as "immutable"; they were
202. BOARD REPORT (1969), supra note 19, at paras. 41-47, app. III. The Gaming
Clubs (Licensing) Regulations 1969 [S.I. 1969, No. 11101; The Gaming Clubs (Licensing)
(Scotland) Regulations 1969 [S.I. 1969, No. 1115 (S 88)]. BOARD REPORT (1969), supra
note 19, at app. VI.
203. Bacon, supra note 23, at 265.
204. 791 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1251 (1968).
205. Id. 1256; The Times (London), Nov. 19, 1968, at 4, col. h.
206. 791 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1258 (1968). This was incorrect, for Lord Stonham
did emphasize that enacted regulations:
certainly could be used, for instance, to forbid any clubs being opened in a rural
area, or indeed in any predominantly residential area. . . .To take an extreme,
they could even be used to restrict gaming clubs to spas and holiday resorts, on
the French pattern, although so long as the chief demand is in the large indus-
trial centres that would not be a very sensible proposition.
296 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 464 (1968).
207. 791 PARL. DEB.. H.C. (5th ser.) 1254, 1262 (1968).
208. 791 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1251, 1264 (1968). Carlisle said that before the
regulation there were only 702 applicants for certificates of consent for non-bingo gam-
ing. Id. at 1267.
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only temporary until July 1970, when the Act would be fully imple-
mented."0 9 The Government's decision to add six more areas did little
to blunt opposition criticism of the Board's assessment of "demand."
When the Conservatives took office in 1970, they declared that future
licenses would be determined by a "general formula," and in February
1971, after consultation with the Board, it amended the regulations to
permit the licensing of gaming in any borough having a population of
125,000, as well as in those areas already licensed for gaming.210
2. Games of Unequal Chance
Of course the tremendous time and money required for a license
for gaming would be valuable only if a casino were allowed to profit
reasonably from games of unequal chance. Undoubtedly, the Govern-
ment must have realized that licenses would have minimal value if
casinos were limited to sessional charges or entry fees. Since it would
be unprofitable to operate roulette, gaming would be driven under-
ground where it would once again be thriving, illegal, unregulated and
untaxed. 1
Gaming opponents, who believed that police enforcement of ex-
isting laws would destroy the profit motive behind casinos, tried to re-
assure themselves that Section 13 of the Act "clearly" prohibited
games of unequal chance and that it was only "possible" that the
Board might allow their existence under Section (13)(2).21
The most bitterly disputed issue concerning games of unequal
chance was whether a zero should be allowed in roulette, the game
209. 791 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1272 (1968); The Times (London), Nov. 19, 1969,
at 4, col. h.
210. GAMING BOARD FOR GREAT BRITAIN, SECOND ANNUAL REPORT para. 34 (1970)
[hereinafter BOARD REPORT (1970)1; The Gaming Clubs (Permitted Areas) Regulations
1971 [S.I. 1971, No. 1538]; The Gaming Clubs (Permitted Areas) (Scotland) Regulations
1971 [S.I. 1971, No. 2029]; GAMING BOARD FOR GREAT BRITAIN, THIRD ANNUAL REPORT
para. 34, app. 1 (1971). [hereinafter BOARD REPORT (1971)]. The immediate impact of the
regulations was to add thirteen areas. BOARD REPORT (1972), supra note 39 at para. 12.
The importance of boroughs was eliminated by the Local Government Act of 1972 which
was effective April 1, 1974. "The existing permitted areas were frozen and none have
since been added." ROTHSCHILD REPORT, supra note 9, at para. 18.36.
211. See generally, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 3, 1968, at 15, col. 2. "If unequal chance
gaming were banned, the only beneficiary would be the real crooks-those compiling files
on compulsive gamblers and waiting for the day when gaming is driven underground."
Id. The Government refused to have the Act prohibit games of unequal chance. "Our
object is not to pass judgment on different kinds of games as such, but to regulate the
manner in which profits may lawfully be made." 758 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1176
(1968).
212. The Times (London), Aug. 9, 1968, at 7, col. e.
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which had been the litigation testing-ground for casinos prior to the
Act. Throughout the parliamentary debate, the governmental policy
was equivocal. It admitted that it was "possible that a single zero
would be allowed under certain conditions," but deferred any decision
to the proposed Board." 3
The Government consistently refused, however, to allow any in-
terim relief to casinos, whose parliamentary spokesmen insisted that
during the period of uncertainty they were in a "deplorable situa-
tion. 1 4 Their only alternatives, argued parliamentary sympathizers,
were to close, operate at a loss, or continue litigation.2 1 5 The Govern-
ment response rejected a suspension of the law during the interim pe-
riod since casinos had operated illegally in allowing games of unequal
chance. Thus, the Government refused to "legalize illegality by Act of
Parliament." '
Approximately one year after Royal consent to the bill, and "after
a great deal of heart searching," and exhaustive statistical study, the
Board concluded that a single zero would be a less undesirable alterna-
tive than either a participatory charge or a levy on winnings." Thus, it
recommended the zero's legalization along with the legalization of
other specified games of unequal chance.2"' When the Home Secretary
announced his support of the Board's recommendation, anti-gaming
supporters concluded that the Government had "sacrificed" the
Board's best weapon for curbing gaming while simultaneously re-
warding lawbreakers.2 1 9
3. Live Entertainment
The success of gaming interests in having the Board determine the
legality of games of unequal chance seemed to be matched by the Gov-
ernment's willingness to defer to the Board on a decision whether live
213. 296 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 430 (1968).
214. Id. at 422.
215. Id. at 422, 423.
216. Id. at 427. Undoubtedly the continuing litigation of Blackburn must have dis-
couraged any slacking of police enforcement of gaming laws. 112 Sol. J. 980 (1968).
217. Bacon, supra note 23, at 262.
218. BOARD REPORT (1969), supra note 19, at paras. 60-61. The house edge with a
zero meant that it would take one-half of the amount bet. Id. at paras. 56, 67-70, app. IX
(1968). Similar types of regulations were formulated for other games of unequal chance,
e.g., appendix VIII pertained to "Blackjack-Proposed Modified Rules." The recommen-
dations were adopted by the Home Secretary in the Gaming Clubs (Bankers Games)
Regulations 1970 [S.I. 1970, No. 803], (as listed in BOARD REPORT (1970), supra note 210,
at app. I). The House advantage in craps "win" bets, for example, was 1.4%, while "big
six" or "big eight" bets were prohibited, along with other mug or sucker bets.
219. The Times (London), Nov. 22, 1969, at 7, col. a.
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entertainment should be permitted in casinos. The Government origi-
nally declared its objective was "to exclude gaming altogether from
night clubs and similar clubs and establishments .... "220 During
committee hearings where the Government proposal was "opposed by
practically everybody, ' 2 1 the Government agreed to issue regulations
in the matter only after receiving Board advice.
222
One factor which undoubtedly influenced the Government was
that clubs in Northeastern England, which provided entertainment
and gaming, were the major sources of live entertainment, and were
similar to bingo clubs rather than "hard" London-style gaming.223 The
Government, while admitting that gaming subsidized "high-class caba-
rets," rejected an opposition proposal which would have prohibited li-
censing authorities from denying a license "on the grounds that the
premises are used for purposes other than gaming.
22
The Board decided that "the mix of dancing, cabaret, drinking
and gaming created an undesirable temptation to young people and an
unnecessary confusion. '2 5 Moreover, the demand for gaming was stim-
ulated by "big name attractions of artistes and the availability of inex-
pensive meals and dancing. Las Vegas was a warning in this re-
spect. ' 226 In July of 1969, the Government accepted a Board
recommendation whereby a casino could be licensed "only on condition
that they do not provide any form of live entertainment." To prevent
evasion, a condition precedent for a license was that there be "no di-
rect access from any other premises" to a casino.
2
1
Efforts to dissuade the Government from adopting Board recom-
mendations were futile. The British Gaming Association argued that
while major entertainers such as Sammy Davis, Jr., might be excluded
from gaming clubs, there was no reason to prohibit limited live en-
tertainment within a casino. 228 The Cabaret Clubs Federation warned
that the Government prohibition would become a "charter for the
crooks" by driving gaming underground.
229
220. 758 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1171 (1968) (emphasis added).
221. 766 PARL. DEa., H.C. (5th ser.) 85 (1968).
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 81. See also id. at 93.
225. BOARD REPORT (1969), supra note 19, at para. 7.
226. 766 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 422 (1968).
227. Gaming Clubs (Licensing) Regulations [S.I. 1969, No. 11101; Gaming Clubs (Li-
censing) (Scotland) Regulations [S.I. 1969, No. 1115, § 881, (as listed in BOARD REPORT
(1969), supra note 19, app. VI). No such prohibition was enacted for bingo clubs.
228. The Times (London), Aug. 7, 1969, at 2, col. a.
229. The Times (London), July 30, 1969, at 2, col. a. There is a general consensus
among casino executives that the live entertainment ban has been a positive factor.
There is no desire to reinstitute it. At most, casinos would desire that a pianist be per-
mitted in the dining area instead of the present "piped-in" music. Interview with Max
Kingsley, Chairman, London Clubs, Ltd. (Dec. 31, 1986).
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Licensing authorities occasionally granted gaming licenses to
"mixed" clubs notwithstanding Board regulations or recommendations
that mixed clubs were "unsuitable." Several successful appeals were
made from denials of licenses because there was casino access from pri-
vate premises.2 30 The Board warned, however, that in those cases, it
would consider "whether to oppose renewal of the license in the light
of the actual operation of the premises where they were licensed." '2 3'
4. Advertising
The Government did not defer to the Board decisions concerning
casino advertising, cashing of checks and whether tourists should be
exempt from the 48-hour waiting period for gaming. In the long run,
gaming sympathizers were unable to change or significantly modify the
Section 42(1) prohibition against gaming advertising.2 32 During consid-
eration of Section 42, the House of Commons Standing Committee
eliminated the prohibition against advertising clause by an 8-7 vote. In
the committee vote, one Labor M.P. deserted the Government and
three abstained, including one Labor member who felt the Government
ban was "stark, staring bonkers" in that it would be totally ineffec-
tive.2"3 The Government, in arguing successfully to reinsert the clause,
stated that even if gaming were legal, "[t]hat does not mean that we
should assist its propagation,"'2 34 especially since a casino would have
to prove demand as a precondition to licensing. A Tory amendment
which would have allowed merely a notice of the name, address and
nature of games played was easily defeated irrespective of the argu-
ment that the prohibition will result in "innumerable borderline cases"
and a "rich harvest for the lawyers."2 35
Since passage of the Act, Section 42 has created considerable in-
terpretation difficulties. In February of 1970, the Board issued an opin-
ion on the section for the benefit of inspectors and trade associa-
tions.23  It urged that the key factor to consider was the
230. BOARD REPORT (1970), supra note 210, at para. 6.
231. Id. at para. 35.
232. The Times (London), Aug. 13, 1970, at 8, col. f.
233. The Times (London), Apr. 3, 1968, at 5, col. a.
234. 766 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 49 (1968).
235. Id. at 58. The Government allowed some flexibility for licensing authorities to
fix a later date for the routine notice advertisement, thus letting a new club better
compete.
236. BOARD REPORT (1970), supra note 210, at para. 13.
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advertisement's "true purpose and effect." '237 In employee recruitment
ads, ordinarily neither the name of the club nor its address should be
shown. Unless the advertisement was in the classified or situations va-
cant column, prospective employees should be directed to a blind post
office box or telephone number. Clubs may circulate their own mem-
bership, but not by postcards.23 The 1971 Board Report criticized club
"cocktail parties or opening receptions," the use of annual reports and
statements at annual meetings in order to publicize gaming interests,
and repeated its warning about non-renewal of licenses for offenders.2 39
When the Evening Standard ran two casino press releases, it was
prosecuted for having informed the public both of gaming facilities and
membership information.2'" The court held that Parliament could not
have intended to eliminate all references to gaming and that newspa-
pers should be able to comment on lawful gaming.24 Despite the ac-
quittal in that case, routine interviews or articles concerning casinos
are often granted only on the condition that the casino be unnamed
since management is "fearful" of "crossing" the Board and its strict
ban on advertising.242
237. Id. at app. II, paras 3, 4, & 12.
238. Id. at app. II, para. 12.
239. BOARD REPORT, (1971) supra note 210, at paras. 65-68. Casino representatives
often show their proposed annual report to the Board, which indicates what material it
considers objectionable. Interview with Philip Tarsh, Director at Lohrno (July 17, 1985).
240. Pitts v. The Evening Standard Company, Ltd., (July 17, 1972 Div'l Ct.)
(unreported).
241. FINNEY, supra note 3, at 203-4.
242. The Times (London), Feb. 25, 1984, at 11, col. a. BOARD REPORT (1984), supra
note 101, at para. 68, states:
The Board will be bound to consider in individual cases whether there are
grounds here for objecting to the renewal of a license for particular premises.
But they derive some comfort from their understanding, following a meeting
with representatives of the bingo trade associations, that it is no longer the prac-
tice to include in an advertisement a membership application form; and they
hope that their views on the more extreme examples of advertising inducements
will be borne well in mind by the industry, and that the need for objections on
their part will not arise in this context.
The Guidelines for Accepted Practice, found in the 1984 Board Report have regulated
and clarified permissible advertising. In effect, casinos may finance sporting events and
charity functions, as long as the casino is not identified. BOARD REPORT (1984), supra
note 101, at app. III. There are still some gray areas. For example: May casinos utilize
match boxes with their name, since they may circulate outside the casino? Interview
with Leonard Steinberg (Jan. 7, 1987).
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5. Gaming Debts and Check Cashing
Pursuant to the Act, gaming debts were made enforceable for the
first time since the early eighteenth century.2" An attempt was also
made to prohibit any check-cashing in casinos when Lord
Nunburnholme, one of the most vehement opponents of gaming, un-
successfully tried to eliminate all check cashing in casinos to protect
"the young and inexperienced gambler" and elminate any "strong-
arm" collections.2 4
The Act requires that all gaming checks given to a casino be
cashed within two banking days.2 45 Until recently a gambler could not
exchange any checks cashed at a casino during an evening for one total
check.24 Checks had to be for the amount of chips received, and post-
dating or other forms of credit were prohibited. Originally, the Govern-
ment accepted an amendment that changed the time in the bill from
two to four days "or such longer period as may be prescribed. 2 4 How-
ever, a House of Lords amendment eliminating any regulation variance
power and shortening the period to two banking days was later ac-
cepted by the Government. The Tory spokesman in Commons con-
cluded it was a "fantastic change-round" by the Government.
2 4 8
In 1968, Britain like Nevada in 1983, repealed all parts of previous
gaming acts which made gaming debts unenforceable.24 9 The opposi-
tion in Parliament hailed the enforcement of casino check-cashing as a
lessening of potential strong-arm collection methods and supported the
prohibition of a postdated check as "self-evidently right. 2 5 As a result
of this repeal, one gambler who lost £1,020,000 in a British casino
within four hours in 1979 was ordered in 1982 to pay £1.5 million
which included interest and court costs.26 ' The Board concluded that
the litigation of gambling debts was "rare, presumably because of the
243. The Gaming Act, 1968, § 16 (3) states:
[W]here the holder of a license under this Act, or a person acting on behalf
of or under any arrangement with the holder of such a license, accepts a cheque
in exchange for cash or tokens to be used by a player in gaming to which this
part of this Act applies, he shall not more than two banking days later cause the
check to be delivered to a bank for payment or collection.
244. 296 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 431-2, 447, 449 (1968). In October, proponents of
the exclusion of compulsive gamblers again attempted a division unsucessfully. Id. at
1390.
245. The Gaming Act, 1968, § 16 (3), supra note 243.
246. Gaming (Amendment) Act, 1986.
247. 770 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 749 (1968).
248. Id.
249. The Gaming Act, 1968, § 16 (3), supra note 243.
250. 776 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 122 (1968).
251. The Times (London), Apr. 1, 1982, at 3, col. h.
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cost involved, the financial standing of the player, and the publicity
which such proceedings might attract.
25 2
Ironically, the legality of accepting further checks after a dishonor,
an issue which later became crucial to casino interests and resulted in
the most serious breaches of the Act, was not especially stressed either
during the debates or during the period of the implementation of the
Gaming Act. Playboy, one of the Board's major targets in this matter,
repeatedly asked the Board, during the 1970's, to issue regulations on
this issue. It was only in 1976 that the Board declared it did not under-
stand how a license holder "can justify his continuing to accept che-
ques when one has been dishonored and the debt remain outstand-
ing."2" The Board concluded that "all license holders" should adopt
the policy followed by some of the license holders, that "to grant
cheque facilities to a player while holding his dishonoured cheques is
in effect the granting of unlawful credit. . . . "2 The Board con-
cluded in its 1979 Report that casino "malpractices," especially check
redemption, resulted "mainly from the desire to attract and retain the
wealthy punter who, through his losses, contributes substantially to-
wards the club's profits."
2 5
The major factor behind the loss by Playboy and others of their
casino licenses was their violation of the credit section of the Act. Be-
tween 1975 and 1977, Playboy club members "habitually" wrote checks
on non-existent banks with Playboy's knowledge. The courts rejected
Playboy's rationalization that while it accepted £2,000,000 in "bad"
checks from a member, it honored £16,000,000 from the same gam-
bler. 25 6 In Playboy, Coral and most other casino prosecutions, the basic
violation of the Act consisted of the concealment of bad checks.2 57
The courts have generally interpreted the credit sections of the
Act most strictly. In Ladup Ltd. v. Shaikh,2 5 8 a casino was denied
judgment when they cashed a check for £45,000 drawn on another
bank, but retained a £7,500 check from a previous debt. In Ladup Ltd.
v. Siu, 25 9 the Court of Appeal allowed the defendant to set aside a de-
fault judgment for the casino for £29,000 in dishonored checks when
the defendant claimed to have received the chips before he had signed
252. BOARD REPORT (1976) supra note 39, at para. 35.
253. Id. at para. 36.
254. Id.
255. BOARD REPORT (1979), supra note 133, at para. 125.
256. Playboy Club of London Ltd. v. Gaming Board of Great Britain, 216 Sol. J. 80
(1980).
257. Miers, The Management of Casino Gaming, supra note 184, at 79-86.
258. [1982] 3 W.L.R. 172 (Q.B.); The Times (London), Feb. 3, 1982, at 10, col. e.
259. The Times (London), Nov. 24, 1983, at 20, col. a.
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the checks. The court insisted a jury must determine the factual dis-
pute, despite the fact that the defendant waited approximately eight
months before attempting to set aside the judgment. At trial, Crawford
P.J. rejected defendant's defense that the checks were not exchanged
for chips or that plaintiff extended credit to defendant. The court,
however, excluded defendant from liability on five of eight documents,
which were in effect house checks, because "they were not cheques at
all."26 To be valid as a check the documents must identify a banker
and a payee. Most of the documents, however, were blank except for
the customer's name, account number, and blank spaces. Thus, the ca-
sino was unable to obtain judgment on the "house" checks.26'
Courts do not, however, expect the impossible from casinos. In
Aziz v. Knightsbridge Gaming,62 the court rejected a gambler's asser-
tion that four checks written within four days were unenforceable be-
cause they were not cashed within two banking days. The court em-
phasized that the gambler had drafted checks upon the non-existent
"Egyptian Bank, Khazar at Nile, Cairo" and it took the casino more
than two days to realize, upon arrival in Egypt, that there was no such
bank.263
6. The "48 Hour" Requirement
Impromptu or impulsive gaming was discouraged by the so-called
"48-hour rule,"2 4 whereby all but bona-fide guests268 of a licensed club
member must wait 48 hours after application before becoming eligible
to gamble.266 The need for an exception to allow tourist dollars was
argued by gaming advocates, especially for overseas visitors with a
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Aziz v. Knightsbridge Gaming and Catering Services and Supplies Ltd., The
Times (London) July 6, 1982 at 9, col. d.
263. Id.
264. The Gaming Act, 1968, § 12 (3) states:
... a member of the club specified in the licence is eligible to take part in
the gaming at any particular time if ... (b) since becoming a member of the club
he has given notice in writing in person on those premises to the holder of the
licence, or to a person acting on behalf of the holder of the licence, of his inten-
tion to take part in gaming on those premises, and at that time at least forty-
eight hours have elapsed since he gave that notice.
265. Mackley v. Ladup Ltd., 139 J.P. 121 (1974), has narrowly interpreted what may
constitute a bona fide guest by utilizing factors such as the number of guests introduced
by a member and whether the member received payment. See FINNEY, supra note 3, at
259.
266. In seeking admission to "night clubs" for non-members, this test has been appli-
cable for almost seventy years. It was usually ignored. Rolph, supra note 18, at 897.
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valid passport. The Government denied that it either intended or de-
sired "that the United Kingdom should be the Mecca of international
gamblers." ' Lord Foley, a Crockford's director, stated in Parliament
that even though "junkies" were undesirable, the 48-hour rule should
be dealt with by the Board."'8 The Government, however, made no ex-
ceptions since it especially wanted to "discourage the junketing gaming
trips organized from the United States.
269
7. Slot Machines
In addition to regulating casinos, the Act was concerned with
many other aspects of gaming, especially slot-machines.270 It proposed
to continue the 1960 Act's allowance of only two27' "jackpot" or unlim-
ited slot machines27 2 with a limited maximum insertion.273 Although
the proceeds could now be used for private gain, the Act, allowed these
machines in licensed gaming clubs or in a member's clubs2 7 as a mat-
ter of right, only if registered by licensing justices pursuant to Part III
267. 766 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th Ser.) 120 (1968). Gaming interests continue to deny the
need for inclusion of tourists with valid passports. See ROTHSCHILD REPORT, supra note
9, at paras. 18.24 -18.33.
268. 293 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 892 (1968). In Parliament, an interested director
may argue and vote on a measure once he has declared his interest.
269. 293 Parl. Deb., H.L. (5th ser.) 907 (1968). Throughout the debates, there was a
fear that Britain would become another Las Vegas. Id. at 105. "[Tlhe Colony was knock-
ing down six hundred to nine hundred grand on just one of my junkets. You know, you
bring thirty to forty high rollers, people who love to gamble and have money to burn in a
casino like that and they'll lose an average of twenty-five to forty grand apiece in a week.
That adds up fast." TERESA, supra note 25, at 219.
270. The annual turnover from slots in 1974 was £260 million compared with £225
million from casinos and £200 million from bingo. POLICE REVIEW, July 30, 1976, at 962,
col. a.
271. "Why two? A close scrutiny of what our legislators have said on this point in
1960 and more recently, reveals no particular reason." Lowe, Gaming Machines and the
New Law, 118 NEW L.J. 791, (1968). See also Spanier, The Chips Are Down for the "Big
Drop", The Times (London), July 12, 1985, at 10 col. a.
272. The Gaming Act, 1968, § 31 (2) states, "[that] not more than two machines to
which this Part of this Act applies shall be made available for gaming on those
premises."
273. Licensed clubs were automatically allowed two machines as of right, but their
operation was strictly regulated. Member clubs must apply to licensing justices for a Part
III registration for slot machines. Unlike Nevada, where upwards of five slot insertions
are common, in Britain the maximum insertion for unlimited jackpots is restricted.
Moreover, the Board has successfully pressured the casino associations into agreeing to a
£100 maximum jackpot.
274. Tehrani v. Rostron, [19711 3 All E.R. 790 (C.A.), held that the Act did not auto-
matically disqualify a proprietary club from being registered for two jackpot machines,
but it was a matter of discretion for local authorities. Id. at 794.
[Vol. 8
BRITISH GAMING ACT OF 1968
of the Act. Throughout the debates, the Government repeatedly re-
fused to allow any deviation from the two permitted jackpot machines.
Undoubtedly it was influenced by organized crime's activity in North-
east England; it may have been influenced by a Wall Street Journal
article which claimed that organized crime first became interested in
Britain after the legalization of slot machines, because "they had
thousands of machines left over after their retreat from Havana." ' 5
It was argued that member clubs should be allowed more than two
machines," 6 but the Government responded that "possibly two is at
least one too many."'2 77 The Government rejected a Tory attempt to
allow the Board to increase the number for member clubs, because
gaming machines were:
a great deal more profitable than those who framed the 1960
Act ever expected. A great mass of vested interest has built up
behind their supply and use, and their commercial and gaming
use has so developed as to make the controls in Part III of the
Bill imperative. As for the permitted number of machines, it is,
the Government realizes, too late to turn the clock back, but an
ordinary club should be well content with the profits which two
machines can bring it. In many cases, it is appreciated that
those profits already subsidize a large part of a club's
activities.2
78
Some members of the House of Lords moved that the number of
machines be increased or decreased pursuant to a Board order instead
of adhering to the "arbitrary" two.2"9 Opponents emphasized that the
machines were addictive, beastly, and a "general nuisance." 8 ' Accord-
ing to the Lord Chancellor, they "represent unequal chance gaming in
its most addictive and least justifiable form," and should have been
"completely illegal." 8 1 Their use "has given rise to more crude crimi-
nality than almost any other form of gaming." '82 If the Board were
permitted to make variations, it "would simply expose the Gaming
Board and the Government to continued pressure by the machine
275. The Times (London), Nov. 9, 1968, at 5, col. c; Wall St. J., Nov. 8, 1968, at 1,
col. 1.
276. 293 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 873 (1968).
277. Id. at 901 (1968)
278. 766 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 174 (1968).
279. 296 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 1393-1394 (1968).
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interests.""'3
Unlike jackpot machines, amusement-with-prize (AWP) slot ma-
chines are not restricted to two and are regulated by Section 34 of the
Act. They may be permitted, by licensing authorities, in amusement
arcades, pubs, cafes, pleasure fairs and at entertainment functions.8 4
The Act does not limit the number of Section 34 machines, but there
are strict limits to payouts.285 It is also impermissible to have both Sec-
tion 34 and Section 31 machines since the provisions are "mutually
exclusive."28 6
The Act required that all slot machine retailers and suppliers be
certified by the Board as fit and proper persons.2 8 7 All profit-sharing
with suppliers irrespective of the type of machine, is prohibited by
Section 28. These provisions were considered a "very striking and
novel feature" of the Act.288 Furthermore, "machines may be emptied
only by the club authorities or employees, not by the retailers." '28 9 A
Tory member observed that these measures were an "unusual prohibi-
tion, to write a contract between two parties which is not often found
in our law."' 0 They were primarily the result of racketeering in North-
east England where club and cafe owners often allowed slot machines
to avoid possible violence that might follow if they refused.29 '
While the bill was in committee, travelling showmens' fairs were
exempted from the leasing requirements. An attempt was made to al-
low a similar exemption for restricted payout on slot machines in pubs
283. Id. at 1396. Interestingly, the Rothschild Commission recommended an increase
in this number without the machines being "installed in ranks in the way they are in Las
Vegas casinos .... ROTHSCHILD REPORT, supra note 9, at para. 18.76. Provincial casi-
nos are strongly in favor of increasing the number of machines from two to six. Interview
with Leonard Steinberg (Jan. 7, 1987).
284. See The Gaming Act, 1968, § 34. See also FINNEY, supra note 3, at 112.
285. FINNEY, supra note 3, at 95; Variation of Monetary Limits Order 1981, [S.I. 1981
No. 2]. Most of the AWP provisions had their origin in the Betting, Gaming and Lotter-
ies Act, 1964. See generally, ROTHSCHILD REPORT, supra note 9, at paras. 16.5-16.9.
286. FINNEY, supra note 3, at 95; Shine and Another v. Nicholson, 112 Sol. J. 880
(Q.B. 1968). Unlike jackpot machines, on AWP machine's payout may be influenced by
the players skill.
287. The Gaming Act, 1968, § 27 states:
(I) . . . no person shall, whether as principle or as a servant or agent, seal or
supply a machine to which this Part of this Act applies unless ... (a) he is the
holder of a certificate issued for the purposes of this subsection by the Board
which is for the time being in force....
288. There are approximately four times as many AWP machines as jackpot ma-
chines. Most of the British slots "are in pubs." Treble Chance, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 12,
1977, at 120, col. 1; Vine, Gaming Machines, POLICE REVIEW, July 30, 1976, at 962, col. 1.
289. 758 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1178 (1968).
290. Id. 1189.
291. Id. at 1190, 1192. 1967 NEw STATESMAN, 897.
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since they contained most of Britain's licensed slots. The Government
opposed the exemption of pubs because it claimed the exemption
would allow suppliers to have a continuing interest in the amount of
use of the machine.292
The Board, in interpreting the Act, advised a supplier that a con-
tract in which the supplier received the entire profit was in violation of
the Act.29 One supplier was fined £3,200, and received a suspended
prison sentence for thirty-two multiple violations of the Act.29 ' This
seemingly severe penalty was imposed because the machines were
leased on an even-profit-sharing basis instead of a fixed rental basis.29
The Board has a simple but thorough remedy for dealing with vio-
lations of Section 28. Rather than prosecuting, the Board revokes the
supplier's certificate without any hearing or explanation. Members of
Parliament had attempted to allow suppliers an appeal directly to the
Home Secretary from Board decisions to revoke or refuse to renew a
certificate for gaming machines. It was argued that, "where somebody
has been holding a certificate I think it is questionable, whether, be-
hind closed doors, the Board should be able to revoke or refuse to re-
new a certificate, thereby quite possibly removing a person's means of
livelihood."'2 96 It was further argued that the unfairness of the situation
was exacerbated by the lack of cross-examination of a complainant, es-
pecially if he were a competitor.29
The Government rejected the proposed amendment on grounds
that it would allow machine owners' rights which were denied to "gam-
ing managers, supervisors and operatives. . . " and that there had
been "as much, if not more, rackerteering in the supply of machines as
in the conduct of gaming clubs." 99 Furthermore, appellate authority is
less necessary where there is one "single body"-the Board, which has
made the decision; "the weight of responsibility tends with the passage
of time to pass to the appellate authority. '"299
Shortly after the Royal Assent (October 25, 1968), some members
of the House of Lords attempted to hold the Board, rather than the
local authorities, responsible for gaming machines in amusements ar-
292. 766 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 170 (1968); THE ECONOMIST, March 12, 1977, at
120, col 1.
293. BOARD REPORT (1974), supra note 131, at para. 104.
294. The Times (London), July 17, 1974, at 2, col. a.
295. Id.
296. 296 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 501 (1968).
297. Id. at 502.
298. Id. at 503-04.
299. Id. The government did agree not to allow forfeitures of a machine by an owner
"without [his] being heard." Id. at 483-484.
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cades and pubs.3 0 The Government said that the Board, if given the
power, would then have to rule on a certificate of consent; if the certifi-
cate were successful, the licensing justices would then have to follow
with a "thorough examination." The result would be "an unjustified
burden of work on the Gaming Board and the licensing Justices," who
should deal primarily with the Act's important matters.30'
8. Gaming Employees
The Act gave the Board authority to certify gaming employees,0 2
and slot machine suppliers,0 3 as well as all casino and bingo clubs over
300. 300 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 629-630 (1969).
301. Id. at 635, 637. Machines in pubs would also be left to the discretion of licensing
justices which "is a new departure." Id. at 637.
302. Section 19 (1) of The Gaming Act, 1968 states:
Where gaming to which this Part of this Act applies takes place on premises
in respect of which a license under this Act is for the time being in force, no
person shall in pursuance of any service agreement perform any function to
which this subsection applies unless a certificate has been issued by the Board,
and is for the time being in force, certifying that he has been approved by the
Board under this section in respect of the performance of that function on those
premises.
Section 19 (2) of the Act enumerates the functions of an individual to which Section
19(1) shall apply. It provides:
Subsection (1) of this section applies to any function which is performed on
the premises in questions and consists of-
(a) taking part in the gaming as a player, or
(b) assisting the gaming by operating or handling any apparatus, cards,
tokens or other articles used in the gaming, or
(c) issuing, receiving or recording cash or tokens used in the gaming or
cheques given in respect of any cash or tokens or in respect of sums
won or lost in the gaming, or
(d) watching (otherwise than as manager, organiser or supervisor) the gam-
ing or the performance by any person in pursuance of any service
agreement of any function falling within paragraph (a) to (c) of this
subsection.
Schedule 5 (3) of the same Act provides the standard by which the Board must
apply in its exercise of the authority granted pursuant to Section 19. However, the stan-
dard is very general, and gives the Board much discretionary power. Schedule 5 (3)
states: "In determining whether to issue a certificate on any such application, the Board
shall have regard only to the question whether, in relation to the premises specified in
the application, the applicant is a fit and proper person to perform the function or act in
the capacity so specified."
303. Section 27 of the 1968 Act states, in part:
(1) Except as provided by subsections (2) to (4) of this section, no person
shall, whether as principal or as a servant or agent, sell or supply a
machine to which this Part of this Act applies unless-
(a) he is the holder of a certificate issued for the purposes of this
subsection by the Board which is for the time being in force,
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which it had an effective veto power. In matters concerning gaming
or of a permit in respect of that machine which had been
granted for the purposes of this subsection by the Board and
is for the time being in force, or
(b) where he sells or supplies the machine as the servant or agent
of another person, that other person is the holder of such a
certificate or permit.
(2) The preceding subsection does not apply-
(a) to the sale of machines of any description to a person who
carries on a business which consists of or includes selling or
supplying machines of that description;
(b) to the sale or supply of a machine to a person buying or
agreeing or proposing to buy it under a credit-sale agreement,
or to the supply of a machine to a person as being hiring or
agreeing or proposing to hire it under a hire-purchase agree-
ment, where (in any such case) the person who is or is to be
the seller or owner in relation to the agreement has at no time
had possession of the machine and became or becomes the
owner of it only for the purpose of entering into the
agreement;
(c) to the sale or supply of a machine as scrap, or
(d) to any transaction whereby the premises in which a machine
to which this Part of this Act applies in installed are sold or
let and the machine is sold or supplied to the purchaser or
tenant as part of the fixtures and fittings of the premises.
(3) Subject to the next following subsection, subsection (1) of this section
does not apply to the sale or supply of a machine for use exclusively at
a travelling showmen's pleasure fair or for use exclusively on premises
used or to be used-
(a) wholly or mainly for the provision of amusements by means of
machines to which this Part of this Act applies, or
(b) wholly or mainly for the purposes of a pleasure fair consisting
wholly or mainly of amusements, or
(c) as a pleasure pier.
(4) The Secretary of State may by order direct that subsection (3) of this
section shall cease to have effect, or shall have effect subject to such
exceptions as may be specified in the order.
Schedule 6, like schedule 5 (3), provides the scope of the Board's authority in the
issuance of a certificate for the purposes of subsection (1) of Section 27 of the Act. In
pertinent parts, schedule 6 provides:
2. In determining whether to issue or renew any such certificate, the Board
shall have regard only to the question whether the person applying for it is a
fit and proper person to perform the relevant functions.
9() In determining, for the purposes of this Schedule, whether a person is
fit to perform the relevant functions, where he carries on a business which
consists of or includes those functions, regard shall be had in particular to
the way in which the business is conducted by him and by any persons em-
ployed by him or acting on his behalf in connection with the business.
(2) Without prejudice to the preceding sub-paragraph, for the purposes of
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employees and bingo managers, the Board was empowered to grant,
deny or revoke, without any appeal, certificates of all employees imme-
diately connected with gaming"0 4 by using the vague standard of
whether the employee is "a fit and proper person to perform the func-
tion so specified."305
Interestingly, it was a committee recommendation which con-
vinced the government to remove the Home Secretary's right to review
a Board decision and thus presumably remove any political pressure.10
Conservatives accepted the need for extraordinary Board power largely
because of the difficulty in proving malfeasance, such as cheating. 0
7
Therefore, "[w]hat both sides of the House recognize is the necessity
for a form of relatively arbitrary rule which would not be permitted in
any other respect, purely because of the dangers inherent in gaming
and gambling. '" 08 As one member of the House of Commons noted:
By the Amendment the serious step is taken of saying that
such a person has no right of appeal against a decision by the
Board that he should not be allowed to operate as a crou-
pier. . . . My first predilection is against giving anybody arbi-
trary powers to deprive someone of the right to earn his liveli-
hood. That is my basic prejudice, and I imagine that it is
shared by the Home Secretary, but after deep thought I take
the view that in the exceptional circumstances with which we
are dealing here it is right to arm the Board with this consider-
this Schedule a person shall not be taken to be a fit and proper person
to perform the relevant functions if those functions are, or if the certif-
icate in question were issued or renewed would be, performed by him
as servant or agent of, or otherwise for the benefit of, a person who
would himself be refused a certificate as not being a fit and proper
person to perform those functions.
304. Schedule 5 (6) of the 1968 Act explicitly vests the authority to revoke certifi-
cates on the Board. It provides:
The Board may at any time revoke any such certificate if it appears to the
Board that, in relation to the premises specified in the certificate, the person to
whom the certificate relates is not a fit and proper person to perform the func-
tion or act in the capacity so specified.
Schedule 6 (4) vests on the Board the same authority in the renewal of certificates.
Where the Board seeks to revoke any such certificate, the Board, under Schedules 5
(7) and 6 (5), must serve a notice on the person seeking the certificate that the certificate
will be revoked after twenty-one days from the date of the service.
305. The Gaming Act, 1968, sched. 5 (3); see also Littman, supra note 1, at 9. Sched-
ule 5 of the Act became effective June 1, 1971. The Times, May 11, 1971, at 4, col. i.
306. 766 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 123-24 (1968); 293 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 856
(1968).
307. 766 PARL. DES., H.C. (5th ser.) 124-26 (1968).
308. Id. at 127.
[Vol. 8
BRITISH GAMING ACT OF 1968
able power.80 9
In practice, the Board allows personal representations by an em-
ployee and it indicates to the employee the issue which had disturbed
the Board. 1 0 For several years, because of lack of investigative man-
power, the Board put the onus of responsibility for an employee on the
prospective employer since if the Board revoked an employee's certifi-
cate, it would be a factor in deciding not to renew a gaming license."
Irrespective of the finality in the statutory language allowing
Board termination after twenty-one days, revocation of certified em-
ployees has become subject to judicial review. In March of 1978, the
Board revoked certificates of approval of a managing director, club sec-
retary, and a gaming manager who had been accused of wrongdoing by
a terminated employee. At the hearing before the Board, matters were
discussed which were outside those specified in the complaint. In the
appeal, the Board Chairman's affidavit stated the extraneous matters
had not been taken into account. At the end of the year, the Queen's
Bench Divisional Court in Regina v. Gaming Board for Great Britain
ex parte Fenton,8 1 allowed an order of certiorari and concluded that
the three applicants had been denied certain procedural due process.
[They] had not been given adequate notice of certain matters
which were discussed at interviews which each of them had
had with the Board, justice had still been done, but had not
necessarily been seen to have been done. Certificates of ap-
proval were restored to the applicants. 3
Thus the principle of natural justice is relevant despite specific parlia-
mentary prohibition of any appeals.
9. Bingo
While the Parliament's attitude toward "hard" gaming was some-
what hostile, nearly everyone would have agreed with the Home Secre-
tary's description of bingo "as a harmless and innocent game." ' Bingo
309. Id. at 128.
310. BOARD REPORT (1971), supra note 210, at para. 14; BOARD REPORT (1974), supra
note 131, at para. 5.
311. BOARD REPORT (1972), supra note 39, at para. 81. Parliament clearly foresaw
that if an employee's certificate was withdrawn the authorities "should have power" to
refuse license renewal. 766 PARL. DEE., H.C. (5th ser.) 333 (1968).
312. Financial Times (London), Feb. 5, 1979, at 10, col. c.
313. BOARD REPORT (1979), supra note 133, at para 37. See also Safeguards For the
Gaming Board, Financial Times, February 5, 1979, at 10, col. c.
314. 758 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1168 (1968).
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was a relatively recent phenomenon in England. Since the 1960 Act
approximately 13,000 bingo halls had sprung up. The 1968 Act empow-
ered the Board to grant certificates of consent as the first step towards
licensing of bingo clubs. The Board was also given power over mecha-
nized cash bingo, which involves a complicated apparatus and many
players.3 15
The 1968 British Gaming Association Report unsuccessfully advo-
cated a £10,000 nightly prize, and that both gaming and bingo be per-
mitted in the same club on the condition that the rooms be completely
separate." 6 The most debated bingo issue concerned the maximum
permitted in "linked" bingo, where a number of bingo clubs would si-
multaneously hold one bingo game for a huge prize.
The opposition argued strenuously that the proposed limit of
£1,000 would effectively "kill" linking and that the Board should "be
fit to determine the size of a linked bingo kitty.131 7 The Government
was unreceptive to the supposed benefits of "linking" and retained the
£1,000 maximum to eliminate "constant pressure" to increase the
amount by regulation.3 1 8
The first Board regulation recommendation was separation of local
gaming from bingo in licensed bingo clubs because "surprisingly, some
of the less desirable gaming" arose from games played before and after
sessions of bingo, and in the interval between them .3 9 Rank Leisure,
Ltd., which controlled sixty-eight licensed premises, attempted to cir-
cumvent the low limits and remedy decreasing attendance by holding a
Bonanza or special game on the premises. The winners' competition
included free participation in its Bonanza Regional Final, which dis-
tributed a £20,000 single prize. The court insisted bingo licenses re-
quired gaming to be conducted under strict rules and under Gaming
Board supervision. Rank Leisure, therefore, could not escape supervi-




315. Regina v. Herrod, [1976] 1 All E.R. 273, 279 (Fam. Div. 1975).
316. The Times (London), March 5, 1968, at 2, col. e.
317. 766 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 144 (1968). At the Second Reading, the Govern-
ment wanted to prohibit linked bingo. Id.
318. Id. at 133.
319. BOARD REPORT (1969), supra note 19, at para. 11
320. Loch v. Rank Leisure, Ltd., 148 J.P. 340 (Q.B. 1984).
The Act prohibited club proprietors from subsidizing prizes beyond an aggregate sum of
£1,200 per week.
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C. Legislative and Public Reaction to The Gaming Act of 1968
The bill debates 2 ' were generally characterized by a lack of parti-
sanship, although the Tories did "have the feeling that Her Majesty's
Government perhaps consider[edi gambling to be evil of itself. We feel
that only uncontrolled and dishonest gambling is evil. We hope that
the Gaming Board will make the same distinction that we do."
322
The Act was also examined and debated carefully in both houses.
Lord Derwent, the Conservative leader in Lords, said the Act "received
the sort of parliamentary examination which very few pieces of legisla-
tion receive," i.e., a second reading, a committee hearing, a report
stage, "a special experimental Public Bill Committee upstairs," and a
third reading. 23
In the House of Commons, the bill was not only discussed thor-
oughly by the House, but also received a "thorough scrutiny"3 2 by a
"standing Committee" which was described by the opposition "as a
working party of both sides of the House trying to improve the Bill.
325
As a party-sponsored measure, the Government, of course, won all
321. It has long been argued that the parliamentary history of statutes "should not
be referred to by judges as an aid to the construction of [British] statutes." RoBISION &
WATCHMAN, JUSTICE, LORD DENNING AND THE CONSTITUTION 20 (1981) (quoting Davis v.
Johnson, [1978] 2 All E.R. 1132). Recently, this "literal' approach has not been followed.
In citing Hansard's Parliamentary Debates concerning the Betting, Gaming and Lotter-
ies Act of 1963 (which strengthened local authorities' power to ban slot machines in ar-
cades) Lord Denning said:
Some people think that the judges should have no regard to the legislative
history of an enactment. I do not take this view. It has led judges, only too often,
to put a wrong interpretation on statutes. These Gaming Acts are an outstand-
ing example ... so I make no apology for setting out the legislative history on
the matter.
Sagnata Industries, Ltd. v. Norwich Corp., [1971] 2 All E.R. 1441, 1444 (C.A.) (Denning,
L.J., dissenting). Admittedly, as Lord Denning wrote to this author, "I am afraid that I
am very much in a minority. The House of Lords have rejected my views on it." Letter
from Lord Denning to the author (Aug. 19, 1985).
322. 296 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 1408 (1968). The Home Secretary concluded the
opposition spokesman wanted to "clean up gaming" while the Government also wanted
to "control it." 766 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 68 (1968). The Lord Chancellor stated that
the Government's goal was "to purge every form of gaming and profiteering and dishon-
esty and to put a stop to the insidious process by which commercial gaming . . . has
come to be spoken of as though it were some form of beneficial fund-raising activity in
support of live entertainment, a sociable life or the balance of payments." 296 PARL.
DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 1401 (1968).
323. 300 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 630 (196?).
324. Eddy, Timetable For New Act, 118 NEw L.J. 1022 (1968).
325. 766 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 67 (1968). The Home Secretary said that "there
was spirit almost of cameraderie between members of the Committee in their efforts to
improve the Bill." Id. at 367.
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House divisions. Occasionally, it would allow Tory amendments or re-
consider. points raised either by Tory members or their own back-
benchers. Over one hundred amendments were considered, most of
which were proposed by the Government. 26 Irrespective of a change in
the minister primarily responsible for the bill in the House of Com-
mons, there were very few partisan snags.
The bill was enthusiastically received by almost all parties and
factions within Great Britain. In fact, as the government observed,
there had "not been a single speech which [was] opposed to the intro-
duction of the Bill. . . . ,,37 The two main reservations about the bill,
according to the Government, were public ownership of gaming 2 " and,
the argument advanced by both sides, that the Board should have
more power. 29 As was noted:
The Government rejected frequent attempts to leave every-
thing to be decided behind closed doors by an independent
body-the Gaming Board-over whose actions Parliament
would have no control. This is because we believe that an auto-
cratic system of that kind, although superficially attractive, not
only would run contrary to commonly accepted conceptions of
justice but would prove to be a blunt and cumbersome instru-
ment, compared to the far more delicate and precise controls
which can be applied through the Bill as it now stands.3
Instead of advocating a centralized system, the bill attempted to
combine local control, such as local licensing of betting shops and
pubs, with "a single central direction as with the casinos and gaming
houses in France and Nevada." '331 "We have blended the two methods
with great care, so as to produce what we believe to be a particularly
potent mixture."33 The Home Secretary admitted that by advocating
some control of gaming through local authorities, he was in a
326. POLICE REVIEW, July 5, 1968, at 1, col. 2.
327. 758 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1262 (1968).
328. This was not seriously debated in Parliament, perhaps because of the determi-
nation of a socialist government that nationalization was impractical. Nationalization of
gaming was popular, however, within certain intellectual circles. See Rolph, supra note
18, at 898. Some Labor members also preferred nationalization. See 758 PARL. DEB., H.C.
(5th ser.) 1241 (1968).
329. 758 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1262 (1968); 293 PARL. DEB.,
H.L. (5th ser.) 856 (1968). Lord Stonham in the House of Lords' debate described the
pivot as "a strong linchpin, and this we have provided in the Gaming Board of Great
Britain." Id.
330. 296 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 464 (1968).
331. Id. at 855.
332. Id.
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minority. 3
Almost every interest advocated a strong gaming board. "[W]e on
this side of the House," argued a Conservative spokesman, "are anx-
ious to give the Board the maximum degree of power."'3 s3 Even croupi-
ers, hoping to obtain union representation, wished to have a union ob-
tain for them from the Board some type of licensing system with
minimum qualifications.3 Once unionized, they later looked to the
Board for relief in a dispute with casino employers.3 36
The British Gaming Association Report urged that all licensing of
gaming clubs be granted solely by the Board.3 37 Likewise, the anti-
gaming "Church's Committee on Gambling Legislation" concluded the
Board alone should be responsible for gaming club licenses. 38 Simi-
larly, in an editorial, the anti-gaming Times also advocated that the
Board have direct licensing authority.339
Anti-gaming parliamentarians unsuccessfully argued that the
Board alone should be allowed to revoke a gaming license since local
justices "must be deeply sensitive to local pressures" and the need for
gaming revenue.,11 Pro-gaming advocates hoped the bill would allow
the Board discretion to increase the number of jackpot machines be-
yond the statutory two. They also wanted the Board to have the power
to regulate the gaming of overseas visitors. Anti-gaming supporters




333. 758 PARL. DEE., H.C. (5th ser.) 1208 (1968)
334. 766 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 98 (1968)
335. The Times (London), June 1, 1968, at 3, col. c.
336. In 1974, about seventy-four employees were terminated by the Casanova Club.
During the course of the strike, Labor M.P.s attempted to enlist Board participation.
Although the Board had indicated earlier that it had no objection to the unionization of
gambling employees, it refused to become involved in industrial relations disputes.
BOARD REPORT (1974), supra note 131, at para. 22-24 (1974). The Board did, however,
take cognizance of the fact that the dispute existed and that it might have a detrimental
effect upon the proper conduct of gaming on the premises. Id. at para. 25. The Conserva-
tive Government also rejected the notion of Board involvement in gaming industrial rela-
tions or the issuance of a report on the strike. 883 PARL. DEs., H.C. (5th ser.) 383-4 (1974)
884 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 26-28 (1975).
337. The Times (London), Mar. 5, 1968, at 2, col. e.
338. The Times (London), June 5, 1968, at 4, col. d. See also remarks of Lord
Stonham, 293 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 857 (1968). The Bishop of Chester had also
wanted the Board to decide where casinos would be located. The Times (London), Aug.
23, 1969, at 7, col. c (letter to the editor).
339. The Times (London), Aug. 23, 1969, at 7, col. c.
340. 296 PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th ser.) 489 (1968). Those who expressed concern over the
possibility of an all-powerful Gaming Board were extremely rare, e.g. Buckwell, Gaming-
the Certificate of Consent, LAW SOCIETY'S GAZETTE, Feb. 1969, at 111.
341. The Times (London), Nov. 22, 1969, at 7, col. a.
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One of the most striking factors throughout the discussion of the
bill was the lack of any desire to weaken Board power. Antony Buck
"echo[ed] the sentiments on both sides that it should be the Gaming
Board which has greater powers and an enhanced role."3 2 In the Com-
mons Committee, the Board was given what amounted to veto power
concerning casino licenses. Under-Secretary Taverne announced that
the committee desired "rough justice" by allowing a Board veto.343 A
Conservative committee member wanted the Board to have "the power
to determine the character of applicants and the nature of prem-
ises, 1"s 4 while a Labor member stated the Board must make a "ruthless
selection '"" in order to reduce gaming clubs. Parliament, especially
the Tory opposition, expressed concern that the Board was not given
additional powers, such as the enforcement of all British gaming
laws.3 " One Tory analogized the Board to a statutory "Jockey Club"
and stressed that it, and not Parliament, should have regulated Parts
II and III of the bill .1 7 Furthermore, it was argued that the Board, and
not Parliament, should have regulated contract requirements between
gaming-machine suppliers and the clubs or casinos.3 '4 Another Con-
servative emphasized that while it was preferable for the Board alone
to license casinos, he had "rather more confidence" in the bill once the
Government explained that local justices would be able to license, but
only after they were "advised by the National Gaming Board,
"349
Members stressed that the Board should have "free hands" and
that "the Board must be arbitrary. It must be autocratic. No reason
must be given. ' ' 5° The Board should make rules and not be tied down
by the government. It should also be the licensing authority and not
have the courts "cluttered up with prosecutions as to how gaming is
being conducted." '351
The Home Secretary, during the debates, stated that the Board
had been given powers "unprecedented . . . for a statutory body." 5 '
Not only did the Board have enumerated powers, but it also had an
342. 758 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1255 (1968).
343. The Times (London), Mar. 3, 1968, at 3, col. d.
344. Id.
345. Id. A Tory emphasized that Board "expertise" should prevent the casino ex-
perts' ingenuity from circumventing the law. 758 PARL. DEB., H.C., (5th ser.) 1243 (1968).
346. 758 PARL. DE ., H.C. (5th ser.) 1196 (1968).
347. Id. at 1189.
348. Id.
349.' Id. at 1205.
350. 758 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1243, 1241 (1968).
351. Id. at 1242.
352. 766 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 364 (1968).
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enforcement discretion."3 53 Under-Secretary Taverne also emphasized
that the Board would be "an extremely powerful body and that a gen-
eral atmosphere will be created in which clubs must comply and keep
on the right side of the Gaming Board or else." 4
While the Under-Secretary defended the need for local justices to
utilize "local considerations," he indicated that, "the Board will be
there to stiffen any justices who may need their backbones stiff-
ened. 3 55 Immediately before the third reading of the bill, Home Secre-
tary Callaghan emphasized that as a result of debate, "the powers of
the Board had been greatly increased" and they have been given pow-
ers "of an absolute and arbitrary nature" resulting from the need to
control the peculiar characteristics of gaming. 356 As Taverne explained
further, "[i]f there is any hint of trouble, the possibility of getting on
the wrong side of the Board will be very much in the minds of those
who run the clubs.
357
Legitimate casinos which were represented by casino associations
were unopposed to the bill.35 They, like other gaming interests, be-
came susceptible to pressure for protection from criminal elements and
the fear of "arranged" fights in a casino that would not pay protection
money.3 59
Gaming advocates, such as the Casino Association, were unsuccess-
ful in removing or seriously minimizing the prohibition on gaming ad-
vertising, or in allowing casinos more than two bank days to cash
checks. They were also unsuccessful in having the Board exercise dis-
353. The right to regulate its own procedure. Gaming Act, 1968, ch. 5, sched. 1 (7).
354. 758 PARL. DEe., H.C. 1269 (1969). One of the most recent scholarly analyses re-
confirms Taverne's opinion of the Board power. "To put it simply, if one incurs the
displeasure of the Gaming Board for Great Britain, the possibility of carrying on one's
operations without intervention is unlikely. Recent experiences have made it clear that
the legislation only complements, but does not supersede, the spirit and intention of
Parliament when it framed the Act." Littman, supra note 1, at 2.
355. 758 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1265 (1968).
356. 766 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 364 (1968). Antony Buck was reassured by the
power of the board to "veto" a casino applicant. Id. at 369-72.
357. 758 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1269 (1968).
358. Quinton Hogg commented that "the Bill is warmly supported by the Casino As-
sociation." 758 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1181 (1968). W.E. Garrett also said, "[tihere is
no doubt that the proposals for tighter control on casino type gambling will be welcomed
by the legitimate owners of the major casinos." Id. at 1191. R. Paget responded to casino
support of the Bill "Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes" [Beware of Greeks bearing gifts].
Id. at 1240. The Earl of Arran who was one of the few parliamentary extremists against
gaming declared that the Gaming Association was "clearly looking forward" to the Bill in
hope "it would allow games of unequal chance, in particular, roulette with the zero." 296
PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 1413 (1968).
359. Controlling Casinos, The Economist, June 17, 1967, at 1210, col. 2.
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cretion concerning the following matters: removal of the 48-hour wait-
ing period before foreigners could begin gaming; increasing the number
of jackpot slot machines beyond two; and increasing the betting
amount total in link-up bingo beyond £1,000 per week.
Gaming interests would have preferred the Board, not the justices,
to license casinos. However, there was minimal opposition to absolute
Board power to license or remove gaming employees. Efforts to allow
appeals from Board decisions revoking certification of a machine sup-
plier were also unsuccessful.
The Gaming Association was unsuccessful in developing any viable
appellate process after Board rejection or, in effect, developing a better
appellate process for licensing rejections. On the most crucial ques-
tion-allowing games of unequal chance-the Association won a major
victory when the Government effectively delegated that decision to the
Board.310
The Association, however, lost on the issue of the Board's selection
process for casinos and won only a temporary victory when the govern-
ment deferred to the Board the decision whether to separate gaming
from casino entertainment. Nevertheless, for the first time since the
eighteenth century, gaming debts were made enforceable.
Some members of Parliament wanted to all but prohibit gaming;
others, occasionally casino directors or representatives, wanted to mini-
mize gaming controls or let the Board make those decisions. The Act
ultimately satisfied neither extreme within Parliament.
III. THE GAMING BOARD
A. Initial Reliance on Regulations and Memoranda of Advice
There was no disagreement in Parliament that the Act would be
enforced through the issuance of regulations and orders. There was
only minor concern over prior parliamentary approval of any regula-
tions. One opposition spokesman stressed that regulations should be
published by the Home Secretary before passage of the Act:
It is vital that we get this business right. If the regulations are
wrong, the matter will either be pushed under the carpet again,
making it hard, perhaps impossible, for many clubs to make a
profit, or it will go the other way and the issue will be as ad lib
as it is now. This does not mean that there must be enormous
delay in the preparation of the regulations. Ample time has al-
ready been at the disposal of the Home Secretary in which to
360. See 296 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 1413 (1980). See also The Times (London),
Nov. 22, 1969, at 7, col. a.
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have an idea of what the position will be.36'
Another Tory who also expressed concern over the content of unknown
regulations admitted that with the Home Secretary relying on Board
expertise to explain regulations before the creation of the Board, cer-
tain problems did arise. 62
The only major issue was whether regulations should be made by
the Board or by the Home Secretary. 6 It was decided that the Home
Secretary must consult the Board before issuing regulations, but not
before issuing orders.3 6 " In order to emphasize the power of regulation
in the gaming field, the Government stressed that "the ultimate
weapon, the clincher;... [is] the regulation-making powers conferred
by sub-section (3). "365
Pursuant to parliamentary discussion, the Board made recommen-
dations through "Memorandum of Advice to Licensing Authorities" or
through "letters of advice" to various interest groups. As in the regula-
tion-making procedure, there were a few members of Parliament who
expressed concern. Antony Buck, for example, said:
[Flor the first time, a statutory lay body will be advising a ju-
dicial or quasi-judicial authority. It is unprecedented for any
outside body to advise the courts, and I am not happy about
this proposal. There is a great strength in the contention made
tonight that it may be better to put this matter of licensing
under the Board itself, perhaps with appeal to the courts. I am
not happy about a statutory board giving advice to the courts.
At the moment the only person who dares to write to or to
influence the courts is the Lord Chancellor, who from time to
time sends memoranda for the guidance and advice of
magistrates. 6 6
In its first Memorandum of Advice, the Board stated that it as-
361. 758 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1257 (1968).
362. Id. at 1209.
363. The Times (London), Mar. 13, 1968, at 3, col. a.
364. 296 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 456 (1968).
365. Id. at 463. Lord Stonham was referring to Section 51(3) of the 1968 Act which
he believed gave the Board "infinitely wide" powers. Id. (emphasis added).
366. 758 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1255 (1968). Lord Denning, in a letter to the
author, agreed with Buck's statement. "As to the board advising justices on licensing, I
agree that Antony Buck's fear was justified. I do not think that any outside body should
advise the Courts of Law, nor do I think the Lord Chancellor should do so himself. I
know the Home Secretary does send out memoranda, but these are not binding at all
and I deprecate it myself. It is most important in our system that Judges and Magis-
trates should be quite independent of the executive government." Letter from Lord Den-
ning to the author (Aug. 19, 1985).
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sumed authorities would look to it for advice on matters of a "technical
or specialised nature or which involve consideration of regional or na-
tional factors. . "3.. 73 Concerning gaming, the Board concluded that
less than 200 consent certificates should support the necessary de-
mand, and that licensing authorities should feel free to restrict particu-
lar games, especially chemin de fer, baccarat and craps. The Board also
concluded that: licensing authorities should refuse a license if casino
access could be obtained from other private premises; "it is undesirable
that a bar, a television set or any other similar amenities should be
situated within the gaming area itself;" licensing authorities consider
the Board's "Table of Standard Minimum Floor Areas for Casino
Games;" card room gaming be separate from casino gaming; and that
bingo membership or facilities be in a totally separate club from hard
gaming. 68
In 1970, in response to inquiries from local authorities and police,
the Board again published a Memorandum of Advice interpreting Sec-
tion 6 of the Act. 6" In summary, the Board strongly discouraged bingo
or card games with a "kitty" in pubs, but had no objection to licensing
authorities allowing small stakes bridge. 370 In its 1980 report, the
Board hinted strongly that "despite the closure of three casinos," there
was still "space capacity in London for all games. 37 1 In its letter of
advice of March 1982, the Board informed licensing authorities that
because London casinos had decreased from twenty-four to fifteen
since 1979, "there may be room for no more than one or two. 37
2
In the first year after the signing of the Act, sixteen gaming license
denials or restrictions were appealed. In every case, the appellate
court's attention "was drawn to the Board's Memorandum of Advice to
Licensing Authorities. 3 7 3 Licensing restrictions on hours were removed
in two cases, and in eight cases restrictions which separated hard gam-
ing from either live entertainment or bingo were reversed. 37 "4 In sixteen
bingo license appeals, thirteen were at least partially successful. 375
Board expertise in deciding what games are permissible has not
always been followed by the courts. In April of 1972, for example, the
367. BOARD REPORT (1969), supra note 19, at app. X.
368. Id. at paras. 8-26.
369. BOARD REPORT (1970), supra note 210, at app. V.
370. BOARD REPORT (1980), supra note 143, at para. 9; BOARD REPORT (1981), supra
note 201, at pare. 13.
371. BOARD REPORT (1980), supra note 143, at pare. 14.
372. GAMING BOARD FOR GREAT BRITIAN, FOURTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT para 14 (1982)
[hereinafter BOARD REPORT (1982)].
373. BOARD REPORT (1970), supra note 210, at para. 40.
374. Id. at para 40.
375. Id. at paras. 6-7.
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Board requested that the licensing authorities revoke a gaming license
because the club had allowed a game not authorized by Board regula-
tions.3 76 When the court held that the club should be given the benefit
of the doubt, the Board appealed to the Divisional Court which upheld
the lower court stating it was "wholly impossible to say the justices
were perverse in saying that it was not proved beyond reasonable
doubt that this game could not fall within the description of American
or French roulette.
' 37 7
In addition to "memoranda" or "letters", the Board, through the
Home Secretary, quickly regulated various aspects of gaming. Some of
the earliest important regulations restricted gaming to thirty-one areas,
prohibited access from private premises into casinos and regulated the
permitted charges for gaming.17 In 1970, the Board issued detailed
regulations on bankers games, such as a 50 pence maximum for bingo,
allowance of both American and French roulette, maximum hours for
hard gaming-from 2 p.m. to 4 a.m.3 7 -and a prohibition of tipping on
the basis that its assessment of the house advantage in unequal
chance-gaming assumed no tipping."' In 1970, the Board regulations
enlarged the permitted geographical areas for hard gaming. 38' The
Board also issued regulations encouraging the diversity of bingo and
the prohibition of live music and dancing. 2 In 1973, the Board, after
376. BOARD REPORT (1972), supra note 39, at para. 9.
377. Id.; BOARD REPORT (1973), supra note 164, at paras. 8-9.
378. BOARD REPORT (1970), supra note 210, at para. 18-19.
379. The Gaming Clubs (Hours and Charges) Regulations 1970 [S.I. 1970, No. 7991;
The Gaming Clubs (Hours and Charges) (Scotland) Regulations 1970 [S.I. 1970, No. 781,
S. 58].
380. The Gaming Clubs (Prohibitions of Gratuities) Regulations 1970 [S.I. 1970, No.
1644]; The Gaming Clubs (Prohibitions of Gratuities) (Scotland) Regulations 1970 [S.I.
1970, No. 1658, S. 381; BOARD REPORT, 1970, supra note 210, at para. 37; Maudling, H. C.
Debs., Vol. 804, col. 263-64 (July 24, 1970). Concerning tipping proceeds, "it was usual
for a large percentage to be retained by the House and designated to defraying over-
heads. In some cases managements budgeted to meet the whole of the wages bill of the
staff employed at the tables from their proportion of the tips." Bacon, supra note 23, at,
262.
Most casino advocates had originally opposed the prohibition of tipping gaming em-
ployees but now agree that the prohibition has worked since now croupiers et al. have no
vested interest in the games outcome.
381. BOARD REPORT (1970), supra note 210, at para. 35.
382. Id. Bacon, supra note 23, at 265, states it was up to the licensee whether to
permit alcoholic drinks to be served at the gaming tables. In practice, no local justice
would license a casino unless it agreed to prohibit the drinking of alcohol in the gaming
area. Casino entrepreneurs are adamant in their belief that the lack of alcohol on the
gaming floor makes sense for numerous reasons, such as the elimination of the possible
claim of lack of capacity from drunkeness. Alcoholic beverages, therefore, are not served
within the gaming areas.
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consultation with the Home Secretary and others, advised its inspec-
tors that if racing rooms were provided in casinos, they were in viola-
tion of Section 1 of the Betting, Gaming and Lotteries Act of 1963
since Parliament did not want a mixture of betting and gaming.
383
B. Increasing Emphasis on Informal Agreements with Regulated
Industries
1. Slot Machine Trade Associations
The most complicated and time-consuming regulatory area for the
Board was that of slot machines. As the date for commencement for
Part III approached,38 4 there was much "uncertainty" within the gam-
ing machine industry as to exactly what various sections of the Act
prohibited, especially Section 34.
Instead of trying to fill gaps by regulations, the Board Chairman
agreed to meet with representatives of the Amusement Trades Associa-
tion and "offered to issue guidelines on the interpretation of . . .Sec-
tion 34 on condition that the manufacturers and operators of machines
would undertake to abide by them."'38 5 After several meetings "guide-
lines" were issued on October 12, 1970, which prohibited Section 34
machine progressive jackpots, "Hold-and-Draw" features, Replay
Credit Meters, a machine which would allow a 50 pence to be inserted
and other devices which made slot machines more attractive. The
guidelines also allowed a grace period until December of 1970 for ma-
chines already in operation to comply with the guidelines.8
In 1971, a similar interpretation of the law was made for jackpot,
or Section 31 machines, with the gaming machine trade associations
again promising compliance. The Board promised that where there was
a specific device of uncertain legality (i.e., Double-Treble Quits), the
Board inspectors would take no action for the time being. 87 In 1972,
the Board claimed all machines were subject to Part III of the Act,
unless winning "depended solely on skill and no chance enters into
it.'388 Thus "pin-table" and other machines were included irrespective
383. BOARD REPORT (1973), supra note 164, at para. 21. BOARD REPORT (1974), supra
note 131, at paras. 18-20.
384. BOARD REPORT (1969), supra note 19, at para. 11. July 1, 1970 was the date when
both Part II of the Act and Part III which deals with gaming machines would come into
force.
385. BOARD REPORT (1970), supra note 210, at para. 45.
386. Id. at app. VI. See also, BOARD REPORT (1984), supra note 101, at para. 43.
387. BOARD REPORT (1971), supra note 210, at para. 43.
388. BOARD REPORT (1972), supra note 39, at 32.
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of whether they were subject to excise duty or even used for gaming."'
In 1973, the machine industry representatives "agreed not to manufac-
ture or supply machines having features which the Board considered
illegal or objectionable."""0
The most troublesome area concerning slot machines was the issue
of what minimum percentage was mandatory for jackpot machines and
whether a regulation to that effect was necessary pursuant to Section
31(6).'0' The Board, in 1973, "agreed" with the trade association that
the average payoff of jackpot machines should be approximately
80% .11 As a result of a survey, the Board concluded that a majority of
machine suppliers who had paid less now agree to a 75% payoff. Thus,
the Board concluded regulations were unnecessary because "all but a
very few licensees" accepted the Board's recommended minimum. 93
While the Board certainly could "prescribe" percentage minimums
pursuant to the Act, it took the unusual step of expressing concern at
jackpot machines paying up to £250. In 1978, in response to Board
persuasion, the trade association agreed to recommend to manufactur-
ers that "no machine be made with jackpots in excess of £100.2'"
At the request of Parliament, the Board agreed to consider mini-
mum percentage payouts for Section 34 machines. In 1976, the Board
reported that the trade association "Code of Conduct for Manufactur-
ers" should give prizes of no less than 70% and in 1984 BACTA's Code
of Conduct required all machines be manufactured to pay out a sum of
70% .39
The other troublesome issue concerning slot machines was their
failure to pay off a winning player. In both 1974 and 1979, Board re-
ports seemed to say that the first time a machine failed to pay off it
was a player's misfortune, but that no prosecution would commence if
the player were given a prize when the machine was initially defec-
tive. 9 It did warn the industry that rigid, expensive regulations would
389. Id. at paras. 94, 107.
390. BOARD REPORT (1973), supra note 164, at para. 63.
391. The Gaming Act, 1968, § 31 (6).
392. BOARD REPORT (1973), supra note 164, at para. 66.
393. BOARD REPORT (1974), supra note 131, at paras. 92-93. As a result of Value
Added Tax and other factors the Board has accepted a 71% return as a minimum,
BOARD REPORT (1979), supra note 133, at para. 89. In 1974, the various gaming machine
trade associations amalgamated in BACTA.
394. BOARD REPORT (1977), supra note 152, at paras. 65-70; BOARD REPORT (1978),
supra note 49, at para. 60.
395. BOARD REPORT (1976), supra note 39, at para. 40; BOARD REPORT (1984), supra
note 101, at para. 83; BOARD REPORT (1983), supra note 49, at para. 46. The Board re-
quired a 70% return and a certificate to that effect for licensed bingo club machines.
396. BOARD REPORT (1974), supra note 131, at para 40; BOARD REPORT (1978), supra
note 49, at para. 61; BOARD REPORT (1979), supra note 133, at para. 85.
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be made unless "more effective supervision" were exercised by the in-
dustry to ensure proper payments. 97 Warned by the Board that failure
to prevent their practices verged on "unfair trading," the trade associa-
tion recommended to manufacturers that their machines have a warn-
ing light when there was insufficient funds. s
.2. Casino Associations
In a manner similar to that of the machine suppliers trade associa-
tions, the Board, rather than issue regulations, reached informal agree-
ments with the British Casino Association which would "facilitate our
communication and consultation with the industry."9 9 The Board
strongly endorsed the association's urging of its membership to return
to the player all monies on a winning "21" hand, or the remaining one-
half "imprisonment" amount in roulette, instead of letting casinos en-
courage patrons to leave the amount as a side bet. It also urged the
association to enforce uniform minimum accounting procedures and to
adopt the Board's views on "the whole question of promotions" such as
free buffets. 00 Similar arrangements were made with the Bingo Associ-
ation for the legal advertisement of entertainers in bingo clubs and for
rules concerning the mechanization of cash bingo, as the Board was
especially concerned with housewives competing at these quick bingo
associations. The Board also sought the association's approval of a
"Code of Conduct" for mechanized cash bingo.4 " The Board was also
instrumental in effectively encouraging casinos to regulate their affairs
to prevent further governmental intervention. In 1980, the British Ca-
sino Association promulgated a "Code of Conduct" which required ad-
herence "to the spirit and intention of the Gaming Act, 1968, as well as
to the letter of the law."4 2 It required access by players to all club
rules, notice of "maximum and minimum stake limits," prohibition of
overseas junkets and prohibition of "payments in cash or kind to per-
sons properly in other employment . . . as reward for directing busi-
397. BOARD REPORT (1978), supra note 49, para. at 61.
398. Id.
399. BOARD REPORT (1973), supra note 164, at para 13.
400. BOARD REPORT (1976), supra note 39, at para, 29; BOARD REPORT (1979), supra
note 133, at para. 26; BOARD REPORT (1983), supra note 49, at para. 115.
401. BOARD REPORT (1976), supra note 39, at para. 65; BOARD REPORT (1980), supra
note 143, at para. 60.
402. Code of Conduct, British Casino Association, March 1980, at 2. Casino execu-
tives consider informal agreements between the Board and the casino associations as
mutually beneficial whereas written regulations often cause problems. Interview with Le-
onard Steinberg (Jan. 7, 1987).
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nesses to particular casinos for the purpose of gaming." ' It also re-
quired disclosure to the Board of corporate share transactions of more
than 5% by another party, and that audited annual accounts be pro-
vided to the Board. 4  Individual casino codes are even stricter than
that of the Association. It is common practice for casinos to terminate
an employee if one is seen leaving in a cab with a club member, or if
the employees have associated with club members either in a private,
business or social capacity.""
In 1981, the British Casino Association requested that the Board
provide authoritative guidelines for Section 16, which governed check
cashing. The Board declined since there were cases sub judice."°0 In
the Knightsbridge Sporting Club appeal, the Divisional Court upheld
the denial of a license renewal because the casino had engaged in un-
lawful check transactions. 40 7 Finally on June 14, 1984, "Guidelines for
Accepted Practice," Acceptance of Cheque (No. 1), was issued by the
British Casino Association; it was the Board's responsibility to "watch
the operation of these guidelines. ' 4 8 In brief, this guideline stated that
no casino would accept additional checks from a player who had writ-
403. Code of Conduct, supra note 402, at 2-3.
404. Id. At the end of 1976, 85 of 121 licensed casinos belonged to the Association
and the views of those who did not belong had "no striking divergence" from the views
of those who belonged. ROTHSCHILD REPORT, supra note 9, at para. 289. By 1984, 110 of
the 120 licensed casinos belonged to the BCA. Steinberg, Running a Betting Shop Group
and a Casino Group in the United Kingdom, Sixth International Conference on Gam-
bling and Risk Taking, supra note 1, at 289. The earlier 1974 casino code of conduct was
largely ignored by members. Kent-Lemon, Significant Influences, supra note 2, at 76.
405. Hadjioannau v. Coral Casinos Ltd., [1981] I.R.L.R. 352 (Employment Appeal
Tribunal), upheld a casino employee's termination because he had various outside busi-
ness ventures with club customers. "We would fire an employee immediately if he left
our casino in a taxi with a customer." Interview with Philip Tarsh (July 17, 1985).
Some casinos have handbooks which mandate precautions to prevent the appear-
ance of impropriety. For example, London Clubs, Ltd. (Mecca) distributes a handbook to
each employee stating that an employee is subject to immediate dismissal for fraterniza-
tion with members or players, including accepting gifts. The handbook specifically dis-
courages tipping by stating:
a) Accepting gratuities or gifts.
All forms of gratuities or gifts are illegal in the United Kingdom. Any
gratuity or gift offered whether across the table or in any other part of the
Casino or off the Casino premises must be politely refused and returned.
Should any attempts be made by persons to tip staff away from the table or
off the Casino premises, not only must they be refused, but immediate notifi-
cation to Management must be made of the incident.
London Clubs, Ltd., Staff Charter 6 (July 1, 1984).
406. BOARD REPORT (1981), supra note 201, at paras. 25, 29.
407. BOARD REPORT (1982), supra note 372, at para. 24.
408. BOARD REPORT (1984), supra note 101, at para. 12.
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ten a previously dishonored check or allow a player to go beyond the
casino check-cashing limits except in "specified circumstances" with
"prescribed procedure." Moreover, all debts must be settled in full
without any compromise in the amount due. Additional precautions
should also be taken for "known defaulters" and "new members if the
check is £2,000 or more."' '
3. Significance of Board Advice or Suggestions
In addition to overseeing the gaming industry, the Board also ad-
vises the Government on such uncertain issues as the date of an "in-
stant lottery" ticket since if it were any but the date it was "scratched
off" there would be a violation of law."10 In Parliament, a government
spokesman declared that he had spoken to the Board chairman "and
he assured me that the Board intends to clarify the doubt that ex-
ists. ... "411 The Board also advised that in the determination of the
value of a lottery prize, "the best course seems to be to take the normal
retail price, including taxes, . ".... 42
It is crucial to an understanding of Board power to be aware that
its "suggestions" to those regulated are regarded as commands and
"are implemented without question.""" During the initial period for
casino certification, the Board "was known to disapprove of attractions
which could make the small gambler raise his stakes. So the bunny girl
croupier and drinks at the table will lose marks.""' Board Chairman
Sir Stanley Raymond chastised various club owners for permitting sex-
ual "immorality" or for "using scantily dressed croupiers to attract the
gullible.""' He also commented that he had the obligation to protect
Britain's half-million bingo players, 98% of whom he said were women,
from being exposed to "rather sleazy roulette wheels. I have seen
women lose a lot of money on them."" 6
409. Id. at paras. 3,6, app. II.
410. 925 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 267 (1977).
411. Id. at 1367.
412. BOARD REPORT (1977), supra note 394, at para 70.
413. The Times (London), July 4, 1977, at 8, col. e.
414. Objection Sustained, THE ECONOMIST, January 17, 1970, at 21, col. 2.
415. The Times (London), December 29, 1969, at 19, col. b.
416. The Times (London), June 21, 1969, at 3, col. d. Concerning roulette variations,
Bacon agreed, "Women are apt to find such irresistible" and thus "the house-keeping
money together with the insurance and hire-purchase dues, was in jeopardy." Bacon,
supra note 23, at 263.
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4. Criticism of Board Implied Threats of Unsolicited Legal Advice
The Board has made "implied threats" to revoke a casino certifi-
cate of consent if a club became involved in overseas gaming.41 7 The
aura of the Board power is so important that an Employment Appeals
Tribunal even suggested that before an employee was terminated for
having "foolishly altered" two check dates and having cashed more
than the casino-allowed number of checks, the Board should have been
consulted:
In the circumstances, . . . the employers might have gone to
the Gaming Board. It is true . . . that there was not any evi-
dence as to whether the Board would have listened to them or
given them any advice. But it is an expression of what the in-
dustrial tribunal are saying, namely, that '[i]n our view, a rea-
sonable employer might also have gone to the Gaming Board
and to see what their reaction was. '418
Most striking is the Board's occasional expression of an opinion to
the press when it believes the publication has erroneously printed legal
advice concerning the Act, especially when the publication's readers in-
cluded many policemen.4 19 When Police Review concluded slot ma-
chine tokens could be accumulated in order to be exchanged for goods,
the Gaming Board objected through an unsolicited letter:
As Secretary of the Gaming Board for Great Britain I must
strongly disagree with the answer given to the question on
gaming machines in Police Review of December 24, 1982,
where you stated that tokens could be accumulated. This is not
so, as the Home Office publication "Introduction to the Gam-
ing Act 1968" states categorically that tokens cannot be accu-
mulated and exchanged for a single prize. It is, however, possi-
ble for a number of tokens to be saved and exchanged at the
same time for a number of prizes, none of which exceed £2 in
value, but not for a single larger prize such as a bottle of whis-
key. If this is done the proprietors commit an offense under
Section 8 of the 1968 Act.42 0
Police Review responded by emphasizing that, not only did the Board
Secretary cite the wrong statutory sections (Section 34 is the correct
417. ROTHSCHILD REPORT, supra note 9, at para. 19.23.
418. Coral Strand Casino v. Heath, No. 94/80 (Employment Appeal Tribunal 1980).
419. Interview with R. Creedon (July 18,1985), who stressed that the Board offers
unsolicited advice only on very rare occasions.
420. Police Review, February 14, 1983, at 333, col. 3.
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section), but the Secretary's comment was "ludicrous" since:
[T]he legislation is far from clear and it is a question of fact for
a court to decide. What we need is some brave person to com-
mit what you allege to be an offence so that you can test it in
the courts. We certainly cannot suggest, however, that any po-
lice officer should report a person who takes two or more to-
kens to be exchanged for cash or goods at the end of a period
playing Section 34 machines, instead of rushing to cash each
one individually. The word 'accumulates' is not used in Section
34 and appears to be purely the invention of whoever para-
phrased the Gaming Act of 1968 in the 'Introduction." '
Another controversial example of Board advice was its opinion
that Lottamatic, a coin operated lottery type machine, was a gaming
machine and thus subject to Part III of the 1968 Act.2 2 This necessi-
tated restrictions such as its being retailed only by those holding a
Board certificate, having a limit of 10 pence per play, and having any
type of profit-sharing prohibited.2
Lottamatic had been marketed as a lottery machine. Thus, the
manufacturer assumed it was subject only to the Lotteries and Amuse-
ments Act of 1976 and exempted from the 1968 Act by Section 52(3).
As Lottamatic explained:
Both counsel and Queen's Counsel were unanimous in their
agreement that this was possible providing the provisions of
the Lotteries Act were adhered to. The only stipulation was
that it must remain within Section 4 relating to private lotter-
ies and not society or local lotteries, as vending machines were
banned under regulations of 1977. All information by us was
submitted to the Gaming Board which took its own legal opin-
ion and, incidentially, refused to tell us what questions they
asked of its legal counsel, or what answers it received.' 2'
The Board sent a letter to BACTA expressing its belief that Lotta-
matic was subject to the 1968 Act, and also requested that the Board
"be notified of any instances of unlawful supply or operation of the
machine so that the police may take appropriate action.' 4 25 BACTA
then sent a circular to all its members, stating that the Board viewed
421. Id.
422. Gaming Board Ruling Upsets Lottamatic, Leisure Play, Oct. 1984, at 9.
423. Id.
424. Lottamatic Hits Back, Coin Slot, Sept. 21, 1984, at 9.
425. Gaming Board Ruling Upsets Lottamatic, Leisure Play, Oct. 1984, at 9.
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Lottamatic as a gaming machine.2
On various occasions the Board has refused to fill gaps either by
regulation or by informal advisory opinions. Throughout the 1970's the
Board refused to answer questions from casinos whether they should
be allowed to cash additional checks once a check has been dishonored.
It was not until the Rothschild Commission hearings that the Board
finally stated that further checks after dishonor should be prohibited
and that casinos should not release a third party of "any part of its
debt from a dishonored check since otherwise, in effect, the result was
the giving of credit.9
4 27
In In re de Keller's Application,42 8 an applicant had asked the
Board whether his newly developed game, Aquarius, which was similar
to roulette, was in compliance with Section 31(1) of the Act and Regu-
lation 803. The Board, after corresponding with de Keller, refused to
issue any such ruling.42 9 Casinos, fearful of being prosecuted as in the
Gorleston43 matter or perhaps of displeasing the Board, refused to use
de Keller's game without Board approval. He then sought a writ of
mandamus to compel the Board to render an opinion. 43' The Divisional
Court held that the Board had the power to express a viewpoint on
Aquarius' legality, but could not make a definitive ruling. There was
not, however, "any even remote possibility of an argument that the
Board has a duty to make this declaration.
'432
C. Evaluation of the Board
1. Initial Pessimism Toward The Board
There was considerable concern whether the Act would accomplish
its twofold goal: the reduction of overall "hard" gaming, primarily by a
drastic lowering of the number of casinos, and the elimination of or-
ganized crime, primarily by ensuring that the remaining gaming was
strictly controlled.
During parliamentary debates, members were often pessimistic,
largely because of their perception of Board weakness. An anti-gaming
426. Lottamatic insisted it could operate the machines on grounds that something is
"legal until it is declared illegal" and that it had asked the Divisional Court for a ruling
on the matter since it "was too complex for a ruling by a magistrate's court." Id.
427. BOARD REPORT (1976), supra note 39, at para. 30-37. ROTHSCHILD REPORT, supra
note 9, at para. 18.61-.67.
428. The Times (London), Apr. 28, 1983, at 23, col. g.
429. Id.
430. Gorleston Ltd. and Another, 1973 CRIM. L. REv. 300. See also, BOARD REPORT
(1972), supra note 39, at 9; BOARD REPORT (1973), supra note 164, at 8-9.
431. The Times (London), April 28, 1983, at 23, col. g.
432. Id. BOARD REPORT (1983), supra note 49, at 14.
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spokesman feared that "we may find ourselves with more gaming clubs
than we had before the 1963 Act. . . . .."I A moderate concluded the
Board was given an "impossible task" in trying to reduce the number
of gaming clubs.4 3 " Continuing roulette litigation throughout July of
1968 resulted in parliamentary fear that the matter of a Chairman's
appointment was "becoming increasingly urgent."4 "
Dismay concerning the Board increased considerably upon the an-
nouncement that the Government had appointed as Board Chairman,
Sir Stanley Raymond, former Chairman of British Railways as Board
Chairman. All sides attacked the appointment because: (i) it had been
assured that the Board would be chaired by someone "who knows a
fair amount about gaming . . . . instead of somebody totally without
experience" in gaming; 36 (ii) the appointment was "political" and it
was "a tragic error" for such a chairman "to be given for the first time
in parliamentary history completely autocratic powers;"437 and, (iii) the
nominee was so "totally unfit," it was reminiscent of Caligula's
horse.438 The salary of the part-time chairman and Board inspectors
was further critized as insufficient to withstand temptations.
3
Members of Parliament also accused the Board of acting "discour-
teously to applicants" who were "treated as dirt; they are not allowed
to talk or put their cases and they are treated officiously."'4 The
Board's second annual report was criticized by the Chairman of the
British Gaming Association as being "irresponsible and hysterical."4 1
There were also numerous complaints from individuals adversely af-
fected by Board decisions. One former casino boss who had lost his
gaming certificate when the Board discovered he had gambled illegally
while off the job "bemoaned his loss of £10,000 a year and a company
car for one offence after sixteen years in the business and there's no
appeal. Do you call that fair?" 2
433. 296 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 496 (1968).
434. Id. at 459.
435. 769 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 984 (1968).
436. 770 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 741-743 (1968).
437. Id. at 743-744.
438. Id. at 746.
439. Id. at 761.
440. 791 PARL. DeB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1263 (1968).
441. Eric Morely, Chairman of the British Gaming Association as quoted in, POLICE
REVIEW, June 11, 1971, at 749 col. 1.
442. Harris, The Illegal Gamblers, 1983 NEW SOCIETY 316.
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2. Overall Success of The Board
Ironically, even those who dislike the Board admitted its success.
Outside of Sir Stanley Raymond, the other Board members, including
a former M.P., a past-president of the Institute of Actuaries, a Solici-
tor, and a former deputy commissioner, aroused little controversy. The
initial Board inspectors were chosen from 3,000 applicants and re-
ceived a fifteen-week intensive training in gaming matters." 8 Most of
the other Board personnel were within the British civil service and
thus immune to almost any allegation of self-serving or incompe-
tence. "4 Within a short time the Board attempted to insure that, as far
as possible, all British gaming was "strictly controlled '445 and that the
Board became aware of "all except the most minor alterations "44 in
gaming. Almost immediately the Board began to promulgate time
schedules to implement the Act and met with as many governmental,
gaming and law enforcement bodies as possible.
4 4 7
Most observers would agree with The Times analysis that the
Board "has shown that supervision by a statutory body can provide a
better form of control" than an act of Parliament with its almost inevi-
table loopholes.44 8 Similarly, the Rothschild Commission, which had
harsh criticism of certain Board practices, concluded that the gaming
scene "has in almost every respect improved" since the establishment
of the Board." One of the best indications of Board success was the
response by the new Conservative government, to persistent parlia-
mentary inquiries, that there was general satisfaction both with the
Act and the Board.450
Another indication of the success of the Act is reflected in the pau-
city of remedial legislation since 1968. It was not until 1973 that the
first major amendment to the Act allowed member clubs to charge up
443. The Times (London), May 21, 1970, at 2, col. e.
444. Lord Allen, who replaced Sir Stanley Raymond as Chairman from 1977 until
1984 had been (as Sir Philip Allen) the permanent secretary of Home Office and thus
"had a kind of proprietorial interest in the operation of this statutory creature." Safe-
guards for the Gaming Board, Financial Times, February 5, 1979, at 10, col. c.; Lord
Allen has made few if any inflammatory remarks. Unlike Nevada, the Board personnel,
except for inspectors, are under civil service and expect to be transferred to some other
department.
445. Littman, supra note 1, at 4.
446. Id., at 4.
447. BOARD REPORT (1969), supra note 19, at paras. 9, 11, 29.
448. The Times (London), Mar. 10, 1972, at 15, col. 3.
449. ROTHSCHILD REPORT, supra note 9, at para. 16.16.
450. 805 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1240 (1970). 856 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 285
(1973).
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to 5 pence for games such as whist or bridge. 1 The Board was given
further responsibilities to enforce the Pool Competitions Act of 1971
and the Lotteries Act of 1975, whereby the Board had regulatory re-
sponsibility for all lotteries of local authorities and societies with a
turnover in excess of £5,000 (now £10,000), a task which the Board
"ordinarily . . . would have preferred not to undertake. 45 2
(a) Reduction of Casinos but an Increase in Overall Gaming
and its Centralization Within London
The effectiveness of the Board in curtailing gaming has been exag-
gerated. Certainly, the number of casinos had been so drastically re-
duced, from about 1,000 to about 120 during the 1970's, that the Board
chairman conceded the "gaming industry had been shaken-up, perhaps
more than we would have wanted. '4 3 Nevertheless, while the Board's
control over gaming was praised and the number of casinos was re-
duced far beyond most realistic parliamentary predictions, 54 overall
gaming, including that of casinos, increased dramatically. The Interde-
partmental Working Party on Lotteries' Report, for example, con-
cluded there was "no country, certainly in the Western world, where
the opportunities for gambling are so prolific as they are here. '456 The
most startling increase occurred in London, which by the mid-1970's
had over twenty active casinos-more than "any city in the world ex-
cept Las Vegas."'"5
Ironically, while Parliament strongly indicated that it did not want
Britain to become the world Mecca of gaming, once "Sterling was on
its knees, . . . together with other political factors such as the Leba-
nese unrest, London became even more attractive to foreign gamblers
than ever before. '457 "If we had to rely on Englishmen" one key
London casino manager confided, "we'd close tomorrow. 4 '  Arabs,
451. BOARD REPORT (1973), supra note 164, para. 16.
452. BOARD REPORT (1975), supra note 49, para. 3.
453. Lord Allen, quoted in The Times (London), Mar. 15, 1981, at 4, col. a. In Regina
v. Coral, No. 1694/B2/82 (C.A., May 20, 1983) (available on LEXIS, Enggen library,
Cases file), the Court of Appeal took note of the fact that only seventeen London casinos
remained.
454. Bacon, in 1970, had predicted the number of casinos "will certainly increase"
after 1970. Bacon, supra note 23, at 265.
455. 887 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 551 (1975).
456. The Times (London), Dec. 4, 1979, at 12, col. c. Although London has only ap-
proximately one-sixth of all British casinos, they account for about 73% of the total
amount bet and "are on the average more than five times as profitable per table as those
in the provinces." The Times (London), Feb. 21, 1985, at 3, col. c.
457. The Times (London), Dec. 4, 1979, at 12, col. d.
458. The High Rollers, The Times (London), Feb. 25, 1984, at 11, col. a.
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Iranians, Nigerians and Hong Kong citizens, together with American
and European tourists, provided "perhaps 85%" of London casino
profits.4 " Although casino profits suddenly leveled off in 1979, the 1983
Board Report expressed "little doubt that the upsurge in [London]
business was due mainly to the relatively small number of high staking
players from abroad.
4 60
(b) Effective Curtailment of Organized Crime
The Board was more successful in eliminating organized crime
than in decreasing gaming.46 ' Most Britains would have echoed the
statement of Lord Reid in Rogers v. Secretary of State,46 that "by
1968 it had become notorious that the control of many gaming estab-
lishments was passing into the hands of very undesirable people. '463
The public was shocked by the finding of a bullet-riddled body of a
gambler known as Buggy, who had been involved in protection rack-
ets. 4 64 On December 5, 1968, the Daily Mail claimed there was signifi-
cant organized crime involvement in London casinos as well as other
British gaming. 468
American gangsters could wind up owning London . . . . Al-
ready it is thought the Mafia has quietly acquired interests in
several London casinos . . . . It's only a few weeks ago that a
Mafia take-over tried to get hold of one of our big entertain-
ment companies made the front page headlines.466
When Associated Leisure, Ltd., a slot machine manufacturer, sued the
Daily Mail for libel, the jury concluded after a twenty day trial, that
Associated was involved with organized crime. 467
During debates on the bill, sporadic references to organized crime
were made, usually by the minority of members who emphasized the
wickedness or insidiousness of commercial gaming. On November 8,
459. The Times (London), December 4, 1979, at 12, col. d. The Times (London), July
4, 1977, at 8, col. e. See also, Kent-Lemon, Significant Influences, supra note 2, at 79.
460. BOARD REPORT (1983), supra note 49, para. 21.
461. This is partially due to the fact that police were given "unrestricted rights of
entry" into the commercial clubs and "far-reaching investigatory powers." ROTHSCHILD
REPORT, supra note 9, para. 16.13.
462. [1972] 2 All E.R. 1057 (H.L.).
463. Id. at 1059.
464. THE ECONOMIST, June 17, 1967, at 1210, col 2.
465. The Times (London), July 20, 1971, at 2, col. a.
466. Associated Leisure, Ltd., et al. v. Associated Newspapers, [1970] 2 All E.R. 754,
756 (C.A.).
467. The Times (London), July 20, 1971, at 2, col. a.
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1968, the Wall Street Journal predicted that organized crime was ana-
lyzing British gaming law before making a move to take control. They
had reportedly offered £625,000 for a 30% interest in a London casino,
whose owners were "thinking hard" about it.46  Organized crime re-
portedly viewed London gaming as a lucrative investment because of
its tremendous growth, the fact that "there are no special taxes as
there are in Nevada," and because the British, unlike the Americans,
were inexperienced "in dealing with organized crime."' 6 9 Based on the
Wall Street Journal article, members continued to ask the Govern-




In 1971, Scotland Yard reports still discussed new attempts by or-
ganized crime to seize control of casinos.' 7 The British Gaming Associ-
ation, on the other hand, responded to press allegations of criminal
involvement "with a hollow laugh.' ' 7 2 The Government, however, dep-
recated organized crime involvement by rhetorically explaining how
the Act had frustrated the "brain drain in reverse of [criminal] types"
entering England. "It is our politics that stopped the [racketeers] not
theirs."'"
One unforeseen result of the Act was the development of various
unlicensed clubs for gaming where considerable drug trafficking oc-
curred. Most of the illegal clubs catered to immigrants, especially Chi-
nese who preferred games of unequal chance which were totally dissim-
ilar from those allowed.' 7' Ironically, the judiciary complained that
there was no legally satisfactory method of closing these clubs until
they were licensed.'75
Another unforeseen result of the Act was that because of the tre-
mendous profits from games of unequal chance, casinos had less inter-
468. Mobsters Abroad, Wall Street J., Nov. 8, 1968, at 1, col. 1. The article states:
"[i]t is not likely that the [1968] law will deter the syndicate from moving in .... " Id.
469. The Times (London), November 9, 1968, at 5, col. c.
470. 777 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1549 (1969).
471. The Times (London), May 3, 1971, at 1, col. a.
472. Id.
473. 801 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 195-196 (1970).
474. Dixon, Illegal Gambling and Histories of Policing, The Society for the Study of
Gambling Newsletter at 1, (April, 1983) points out that the "Chinese community's illegal
gambling is tolerated with minimal interference." The Board, the Casino Association and
a select parliamentary committee have recommended against permitting the Chinese to
establish their own licensed casinos with their own games. BOARD REPORT (1971), supra
note 210, at para. 60, states 45 of 94 prosecutions for illegal gaming in unlicensed clubs
involved Chinese.
475. The Times (London), Jan. 12, 1977, at 4, col. a. The Act, however, has been
utilized to jail card tricksters who prey on tourists. See The Times (London), Aug. 22,
1985, at 3, col. a; The Times (London), Aug. 24, 1985, at 3, col. a.
[Vol. 8
BRITISH GAMING ACT OF 1968
est in providing "soft-gaming" facilities. Poker players claim they were
often driven into "illegal" clubs. Perhaps stringent Board regulations,
such as allowing a maximum charge per hour and prohibiting any levy
on winnings, helped dissuade London casinos from providing necessary
facilities. Perhaps poker players preferred playing without having to
terminate the game at 4 a.m.""8
While organized crime has been virtually eliminated from licensed
gaming, which has been brought under strict Board control, other
problems remained unresolved by the Act, and the efforts of the
Board. One major concern was the increasing tendency of a few pub-
licly held corporations to dominate the London gaming market. It has
been debated whether the increased tendency toward monopolization
was ironic or whether it was the result of a deliberate policy to prevent
competition. This concept of monopolization was rarely discussed in
Parliament. 7
The Board was concerned early with the increasing degree of ca-
sino concentration "in the hands of a small number of public compa-
nies," and believed that anything "approaching monopolization in the
field must arouse public concern.' 47 The Rothschild Commission was
aware of the increasing concentration of London casino ownership, but
saw in this "nothing inimical to the public interest.' ' 7  When
Pleasurama attempted to merge with Trident, the Board stressed that
concentration had increased since the Rothschild Commission and that
it preferred "to see a mixture of small and large operators." It there-
fore opposed the merger "not simply [on] a matter of market share
... . but on principle.'4 8 0 The Board warned that if the Monopolies
and Mergers Commission permitted the merger, it would have affected
eleven of the nineteen casinos in London at the time.'81
476. BOARD REPORT (1969), supra note 19, at para. 75-76; BOARD REPORT (1971),
supra note 210, para. 60, concluded that illegal gaming was primarily confined to poker.
Harris, The Illegal Gamblers, 1983 NEW Soc'v 316, states that only Aspinall's, alone
among the London casinos, still provides poker facilities. The Board disagrees with this
conclusion that there is only one casino providing poker. The Board emphasized that
poker players often prefer not to quit at 3:00 or 4:00 a.m. Interview with R. Creedon
(July 18, 1985).
477. Miers, supra note 5, at 39. "We had so many issues to discuss in the Gaming Act
that the question of monopolies never arose." Interview with Sir Antony Buck, (July 17,
1985). David Weitzman said it was erroneous "to say that what we ought to establish
here is a monopoly of gaming clubs ..... 766 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 88 (1968).
478. ROTHSCHILD REPORT, supra note 9, at para. 18.14.
479. Id.
480. MONOPOLIES COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6 at paras. 8.6 and 8.8.
481. Views of the Board, reprinted in MONOPOLIES COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6,
at paras. 8.3, 8.4, 8.8.
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IV. CONCLUSION
One problem for the Board has been the need to reevaluate its
mission in light of its success in reducing casinos and in minimizing or
eliminating the influence of organized crime in legal gaming. The
Rothschild Commission has strongly suggested that the Board formula
for casinos is outdated and that decisions for new areas for casinos
should be left to licensing authorities. "We think," said the Commis-
sion, "the time has come to scrap the permitted areas and rely on the
good sense of local licensing authorities backed by the advice of the
Gaming Board."4 82 The Commission also suggested that the Board
change its emphasis from crime-busting to increasing its supervision
over lotteries and slot machines.4 " Unfortunately, the vast majority of
the Rothschild Commission's recommendations have not been followed
by either Parliament or the Board.
Perhaps the most important long-range Board problem is its in-
creasing reliance upon informal agreements with regulated trade or
special interest groups. The Rothschild Commission harshly criticizd
these "bluff" agreements as being no longer necessary.4 4 The relative
lack of regulations, and reliance instead on informal agreements and
excessively vague standards, "exemplifies" the "difficulties which regu-
lating agencies face when endeavoring to give specific content to open-
ended performance standards."8 "
The Fenton4 86 decision, while creating further procedural due pro-
cess, also reemphasizes the British need "for an effective administra-
tive court [to] readily assum[e] the power to investigate and review the
decisions of public bodies. Such a court would not hamper public ad-
ministration. On the contrary, by ensuring that administration is fairly
carried out, it would make executive decisions more acceptable to a
sorely tried public. s4 8
7
Yet, there has been a near universal conclusion that the Board and
the Act have been successful. Participants as diverse as Lord Denning,
Rev. Gordon Moody, Philip Tarsh, Max Kingsley, Sir Antony Buck,
Q.C., M.P., Mark Richard Carlisle, Q.C., M.P., Dick Taverne, former
Under-Secretary, and William Rees-Davies, Q.C., former M.P., have
been generally pleased with the results of the Act.488 Moreover, it is
482. ROTHSCHILD REPORT, supra note 9, at para. 18.45.
483. Id. at paras. 16.26, 18.76.
484. Id.
485. Miers, supra note 5, at 50.
486. Financial Times, Feb. 5, 1979, at 10, col. c.
487. Cline, Zero for Crockford's, Spectator, Mar. 14, 1970, at 334, col. 2.
488. Rev. Moody was an active supporter of Blackburn. All have informed the author
that they are pleased with the Act and the Board. Telephone interview with Rev. Moody
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inconceivable that there is any viable alternative to present controls
over British gaming.
(July 16, 1985). Letter from Lord Denning to the author (Aug. 19, 1985); Interview with
Philip Tarsh (July 17, 1985); Interview with Max Kingsley (Dec. 31, 1986); Interview
with Sir Antony Buck (July 17, 1985); Interview with William Rees-Davies (Sept. 9
1986); Interview with Dick Taverne (July 19, 1985); Letter from Mark Carlisle to the
author (Mar. 26, 1986). As always, there is some disagreement with the overall success of
the Act and the Board; e.g., Kent-Lemon, supra note 2 at 79, states "One more major
scandal might lead to the government's deciding to pull the plug out of the industry by
nationalization or by repeal of the 1968 Act."
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